Rampini and Pratt JJ.
1. The only point which arises in this appeal is whether the suit is barred as against the minors Narendra Nath Sarkar and Surendra Nath Sarkar, who are the defendants No Section 1 and 2.
2. The suit is brought upon a bond dated the 11th Bysack 1295, executed by Soudamini Dasi, the certificated guardian of the minor defendants, and one Kamalbasini I asi. The bond was executed for a sum of R Section 500 borrowed by Jogendra Nath Sarkar, the brother of the minors, who is now dead. The plaintiff now sues for the debt.
3. The Lower Appellate Court has held that the suit is barred as against Kamalbasini Dasi, the defendant No. 3, but that a fresh period of limitation has arisen owing to certain payments made by the certificated guardian of the minor defendants No Section 1 and 2, so that the suit is not time-barred against them.
4. The defendants No Section 1 and 2 appealed to this Court and, on their behalf, it is contended that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is wrong and that the suit is barred as against them, because their certificated guardian who made certain payments for interest for them was not an agent duly authorized to pay interest on their behalf within the meaning of Section 20 of Act XV of 1877. In support of this contention the pleader for the appellants has called attention to the case of Chhato Ram v. Bilto Ali (1898) I. L. R. 26 Cale. 51. and the case of Maharana Shri Ranmal Singji v. Vadilal Vakhat Chand (1894) I. L. R. 20 Bom. 61. These cases, however, relate not to Section 29 of the Limitation Act, but to Section 19. They lay down, no doubt, ' that an acknowledgment of debt by a guardian of a minor appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act does not bind a minor and is not such an acknowledgment Under Section 19 of the Limitation Act as would give a new period of limitation against the minor.' The learned pleader, in particular, calls attention to the terms of the judgment in the case of Chhato Ram v. Bilto Ali (1), in which the learned Judges say as follows: 'A guardian is not ordinarily an agent. He has certain statutory powers in regard to the property under his management, and no more. In some three decisions of this Court it has been decided that a natural guardian has not the power to acknowledge a debt so as to bind a minor Under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. We can see no difference in regard to that section between a guardian who has obtained a certificate and one who has not.'
5. Now the appellants contend that the words which the Judges who decided that case were interpreting were the words ' agent duly authorized on this behalf ' in Section 19; and, as these are the very words which occur in Section 20, therefore this decision must afford a guide to the interpretation of the same words in Section 20. We do not agree with this contention. The provisions of Section 19 are very different from those of Section 20. The provisions of Section 19 relate to the effect of an acknowledgment in writing so as to give a new period of limitation, but it may very well be that a person who is not an agent duly authorized to give an acknowledgment in writing, so as to start a new period of limitation under Section 19, may yet be an agent authorized to pay interest upon a debt within the meaning of Section 20. In this case we think that the certificated guardian of the minor was really the agent authorized to pay interest on the debt. The guardian, Soudamini Dasi, was the person, who executed the bond on behalf of the minors, and she subsequently made seven payments on account of interest between Kartick 1300 and Chaitra 1301. This has led the Judge to conclude that she was the agent for the payment of interest; and then there is the subsequent payment by the new guardian, Bhobo Nath Roy Chowdhry, of Rs. 10 on the 28th Assin 1302.
6. We, therefore, think that the Subordinate Judge is right in coming to the conclusion that these payments of interest were made by agents duly authorized on behalf of the minor Section For, if these agents could not pay interest, then no one could pay interest; and the creditor would, in that case, be forced to sue the minor for the debt before the expiry of the period of limitation allowed by law and could not give them any grace. To interpret the law in this way would be against- the interest of minors in general.
7. In these circumstances we must find, as the Subordinate Judge has found, that the payment of interest made by the guardian has given a new period of limitation and that the suit is not time-barred.
8. The learned pleader for the appellants has raised another ground of appeal which, however, he has not pressed very strongly, namely, that a decree for the whole debt should not have been given against the appellants. But we think that, under the terms of the bond, it is clear that the minors were jointly and severally liable, and that, although the suit has-been dismissed as against the defendant No. 3, yet a decree for the whole amount has been very properly given against the two defendants, who are appellants before us.
9. The appeal is dismissed with costs.