Caspersz and Sharfuddin, JJ.
1. On the 12th May 1911, this Court discharged a Rule obtained (by the petitioner) upon the sole ground, whether a certain Deputy Magistrate had jurisdiction to remove a case from the file of another Deputy Magistrate. Other grounds had been taken in that application, but this Court (Holmwood and Sharfuddin JJ.) gave a Rule on the one ground only. Nothing was said, in this Court's judgment, as to whether the petitioner had the Court's permission to renew his application on the other grounds on which that Rule had not been issued.
3. On the 15th May 1911, we granted another Rule upon the first and fourth grounds specified, which had reference to matters other than the question of jurisdiction of one Deputy Magistrate to transfer proceedings from the file of another Magistrate. These grounds go much deeper into the, merits of the controversy between the parties, and, undoubtedly, challenge the jurisdiction of the Deputy Magistrate to pass an order declaring the opposite party to be in possession of the property in dispute.
4. On the Rule coming on for hearing, the learned Counsel for the opposite party contended that this Court had no jurisdiction to grant a fresh Rule when, upon the previous occasion, the whole matter was before the Court and a Rule was granted on one only of the several grounds. We think this contention is well-founded.
5. The first case relied upon, Rai Radha Gobind v. Gossain Mohendra Gir (1901) 6 C.W.N. 340, may, perhaps, be distinguished, in . one respect, that is to say, the two Rules granted in that case, one after another, were in similar terms. In that case, however, the petitioner obtained liberty to apply for another Rule if so advised, and so the authority is in point, because the present petitioner never applied for, nor obtained permission to ask for another Rule. The other case cited to us, Bibhuty Mohan Roy v. Dasimoni Dassi (1902) 10 C.L.J. 80, 82, dealt with a case that had not been heard and determined on the merits. In such a case the Court has power to re-open, and dispose of, the matter; but it cannot be said, in the present instance, that the first Rule was not decided on the merits. The points selected by this Court, for hearing and determination, was the one point we have mentioned and that Rule was disposed of on that particular question. The second authority cited to us is, undoubtedly, in favour of the contention of the opposite party.
6. We understand that, as a matter of practice, when a Rule is issued by this Court on one or more selected grounds, no further application can be granted on the remaining grounds not so selected. We think this is a salutary practice and one to be followed on principle as well. The preliminary, objection prevails. The rule is discharged.