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Kumudnath Dutta Vs. Banga Luxmi Hosiery Mills Ltd. and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtKolkata High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revn. Case No. 365 of 1954
Judge
Reported inAIR1956Cal184,59CWN1093
ActsWest Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 - Section 19(6), 19(7), 19(8) and 19(9); ;Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908
AppellantKumudnath Dutta
RespondentBanga Luxmi Hosiery Mills Ltd. and ors.
Appellant AdvocateSurendra Nath Basu (Sr.), Adv.
Respondent AdvocateArun Prokas Chatterjee, Adv.
Excerpt:
- .....was no petition, filed by the landlord-petitioner, for withdrawal or 'payment to him' 'of the rent deposited'. this petition, i have been told in 'this court by the petitioner's learned advocate, was made some time later and long beyond thirty days from the receipt of notice of deposit.clearly, therefore, the first condition as prescribed by sub-section (9), has not been complied with and the rent controller and the appellate judge were both right in throwing out the petitioner's complaint on that preliminary ground.3. it was contended by mr eose on behalf of the petitioner that this reading of sub-section (9) would conflict with the provisions of sub-section (8), entitling the landlord to withdraw the 'rent deposited' within 'five years from the date of posting of notice of the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

P.N. Mookerjee, J.

1. This rule arises out of a proceeding under Sub-section (9) of Section 19, Rent Control Act of 1950, Under that sub-section, the landlord is entitled to 'complain to the Controller that the statements in the tenant's application of the reasons and circumstances which fed him to deposit the rent are untrue'.

The petitioner-landlord's application under the said sub-section has been thrown out by the Rent Controller on the preliminary ground that the two conditions which are pre-requisite for the maintainability of the application, as prescribed in the said Sub-section (9), have not been complied with in the present case. The Rent Controller's decision has been affirmed on appeal by the learned Appellate Judge.

2. In my opinion, the decision, complained of, is correct and ought to be affirmed. There is no dispute as to the facts. The notice of deposit was received by the landlord-petitioner on 7-2-1953, The complaint under Sub-section (9) was filed on 5-3-1953. This was admittedly within 30 days as required by 'the second condition, prescribed by the said Sub-section (9).

The other condition however, namely, that the complaint has to be made 'at the time of filing the petition mentioned in Sub-section (6) or (7)' was not complied with in the present case, as, admittedly., at the time when the complaint was made, that is. On 5-3-1953, there was no petition, filed by the landlord-petitioner, for withdrawal or 'payment to him' 'of the rent deposited'. This petition, I have been told in 'this Court by the petitioner's learned Advocate, was made some time later and long beyond thirty days from the receipt of notice of deposit.

Clearly, therefore, the first condition as prescribed by Sub-section (9), has not been complied with and the Rent Controller and the Appellate Judge were both right in throwing out the petitioner's complaint on that preliminary ground.

3. It was contended by Mr Eose on behalf of the petitioner that this reading of Sub-section (9) would conflict with the provisions of Sub-section (8), entitling the landlord to withdraw the 'rent deposited' within 'five years from the date of posting of notice of the deposit'. I do not think that that is the correct position.

Sub-section (8) prescribes, in effect, the maximum time-limit for the making of an application for withdrawal - pure and simple - of the 'rent deposited'. If, however, the landlord wants' to avail himself of the special right of complaint, given to him in Sub-section (9), he must comply with each of the requisites, laid down in that sub-section, namely, that the complaint must be made 'at the time of filing' of the petition or application for withdrawal of the 'rent deposited' and 'within 'thirty days from receiving the notice of deposif'.

The combined effect of these two clauses is obviously to put a special time-limit of thirty days from the receipt of the notice of deposit for the making or filing of an application for payment or withdrawal of the 'rent deposited', so far as the said application is to form the basis of a complaint under Sub-section (9), as required therein, but that, in my Opinion, hardly presents any conflict with sub-s.

The normal period for withdrawal of the 'rent deposited' is prescribed in Sub-section (8) of Section 19 and Sub-section (9) only lays down, in effect, a shorter period for this application for withdrawal when the further special right of complaint, given by this subsection, is sought to be availed of and exercised on the basis thereof. The petitioner's final contention is, accordingly, rejected.

4. The other argument of Mr. Bose was that the opening words of Sub-section (9), namely, 'at the time of filing the petition mentioned in Sub-section (6) or (7)' are redundant.

That also cannot be accepted, The clear intention of Sub-section (9) is that, if the landlord wants to make a complaint under that sub-section, he must comply with both the conditions, laid down therein, and thus necessarily make his application for withdrawal of the deposit within the period of 'thirty days from receiving the notice of deposit' and simultaneously with 'the complaint. That is the plain reading of the sub-section.

There is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the two conditions. They are plainly capable of having effect without leading to any absurdity or unreasonableness. Rather, it seems proper and reasonable 'that they should both have full effect. It is an ancient and settled rule of construction that normally no words of a statute should be rejected and each part of it and each of the words used by the Legislature should be given effect,

It is a sound presumption, usually made in the matter of interpretation of statutes, that words are not used by the Legislature without a meaning and that effect should be given, if possible, to each of them. In the absence of compelling circumstances pointing to the contrary, 'the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or say anything in vain.'

I do not find anything in this case to depart from this ordinary principle or presumption against redundancy. On the other hand, as I nave already pointed out, it is not only possible but also perfectly reasonable -- and indeed, only proper -- to give effect to both the clauses' and conditions, found mentioned in Sub-section (9). I, accordingly, reject Mr. Bose's second argument too.

5. As a last resort, it was faintly urged by Mr. Bose that the above view of Sub-section (9) would be opposed to the other canon of construction, no less firmly established, that the statute must be reads as a whole but the only conflict which could be suggested was with Sub-section (8). That conflict, as I have-already shown, does not exist and so this argument also must fail.

6. In the result, this Rule is discharged but,in the circumstances of the case, I direct the partiesto bear their own costs in this Court.


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