Trevelyan and Rampini, JJ.
1. The question in this case is whether an Appellate Court, in rejecting an appeal under the provisions of Section 421, Criminal Procedure Code, is obliged to give a judgment containing the particulars enumerated in Section 367 of the Code, or at any rate, give reasons for its decision. In this case the Magistrate of Midnapore, acting as an Appellate Court, has, in rejecting the appeal, simply recorded the words 'appeal rejected.' The question is an important one affecting a large number of tribunals in this country. So far as we know, this Court has always considered that Section 421 does not require a formal judgment of any description. There seems to be no reported or decided case on the subject in this Court. In a case of In the matter of the petition of Bala Subbana (Weir's Rep. 1009) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court expressly held that no judgment was necessary. Mr. Justice Brodhurst, sitting as a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, expressed an opinion that reasons, however concise, should be given for rejecting an appeal under Section 421 [see Queen-Empress v. Sam Narain I.L.R. 8 All. 514]. The decision of this point was not absolutely necessary to Mr. Justice Brodhurst's decision, but he expressed the opinion after argument of the question. We think that the question really depends upon the meaning of the word 'summarily' in Section 421 of the Code. In the absence of that word, there would seem from the Code to be no reason why a judgment is more required in a case where an appeal is heard and dismissed than in a case where it is rejected under Section 421, but the word 'summarily' we think differentiates the cases. The word 'summarily' ordinarily means in an informal manner and without the delay of formal proceedings. This, we think, would seem to show that the Judge was entitled to reject the appeal without any formality at all; therefore, without the formality of either a recorded judgment or reasons of any description. We think we are supported in this conclusion by the construction which this Court has, as far as we know, ordinarily placed upon Section 421, and we see no reason to express any opinion which will have the effect of causing subordinate tribunals to depart from the practice which they have followed,--at any rate in this Province, for some time. There is no other question in the case. As far as the sentence is concerned, it does not seem to be excessive. We discharge the rule.