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Bama Churn Chattopadhya and anr. Vs. Huri Das Bundopadhya - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectFamily;Property
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1888)ILR15Cal780
AppellantBama Churn Chattopadhya and anr.
RespondentHuri Das Bundopadhya
Cases ReferredGooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose
Excerpt:
hindu law - inheritance--dayabhaga school--brother's daughter's son--great-grandson of paternal grandfather. - 1. the property in dispute in this case belonged to one nobin chunder bundopadhya; and the question raised before us in appeal is whether or no the plaintiff, who is the brother's daughter's son of the said nobin chunder, is preferential heir to the defendants, who are his (nobin's) paternal grandfather's great grandsons. the parties are governed by the dayabhaga school of law.2. this question is indeed a difficult one. in the case of gobindo huree-kar v. womesh chunder roy w.r.f. b 176 it was held by a bench of three judges of this court that a father's brother's daughter's son is no heir according to hindu law. this decision was subsequently overruled in the case of gooroo gobind shaha v. anund lal ghose 13 w.r. (f.b.) 49 (57) it being then held that according to the true interpretation.....
Judgment:

1. The property in dispute in this case belonged to one Nobin Chunder Bundopadhya; and the question raised before us in appeal is whether or no the plaintiff, who is the brother's daughter's son of the said Nobin Chunder, is preferential heir to the defendants, who are his (Nobin's) paternal grandfather's great grandsons. The parties are governed by the Dayabhaga school of law.

2. This question is indeed a difficult one. In the case of Gobindo Huree-kar v. Womesh Chunder Roy W.R.F. B 176 it was held by a Bench of three Judges of this Court that a father's brother's daughter's son is no heir according to Hindu law. This decision was subsequently overruled in the case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose 13 W.R. (F.B.) 49 (57) it being then held that according to the true interpretation of the Dayabhaga, and the 'principle of spiritual benefit which constitutes the fundamental basis of the Law of Inheritance, propounded by the Dayabhaga,' a father's brother's daughter's son, who occupies a position analogous to that occupied by a brother's daughter's son, was a sapinda and an heir. The precise position which he was entitled to occupy in the rank of heirs was, however, left undetermined in that case.

3. The question as to whether a brother's daughter's son is entitled to succeed as against a great grandson of the paternal grand father, and which is the very question we have to determine in this case, was subsequently discussed in the case of Gobind Pershad Talookdar v. Woomesh Ohunder Surmah Ghuttack 23 W.R. 117 : 15 B.L.R. 35 before a Bench of two Judges, consisting of Sir Richard Couch and Mr. Justice Ainslie, and it was held that a brother's daughter's son though an heir according to the Full Bench decision in the case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose could not have a preferential title to the great grandson of the paternal grandfather. And it appears that this decision has been followed in several cases--see Oodoy Churn Mitter, In re 4 C. 411; Juggut Narain Singh v. Collector of Manbhoom 4 C. 413 (note). Gopal Chunder Nath Coondoo v. Haridas Chini 11 C. 343; also three unreported cases, Special Appeal No. 2640 of 1875, decided on the 6th June 1877 by Mitter and Birch, JJ.; Special Appeal No. 1747 of 1880, decided on the 6th July 1882 by Field and Bose, JJ., and Special Appeal No. 754 of 1880, decided on the 22nd June 1881. In the case of Digumber Roy Chowdhry v. MotiLal Bundopadhya 9 C. 563 decided by a Full Bench of this Court, the question was raised as between a brother's daughter's son and a great-great-great-grandson of the great-great-great-grandfather of the deceased owner, and it was held that the latter, being only a sakulya, was not entitled to succeed in preference to a brother's daughter's son, he being a cognate sapinda.

4. We have it then, as decided by two Full Bench decisions, that brother's daughter's son is a sapinda and heir, and that he is entitled to succeed in preference to a sakulya; but that, as held by several Division Benches, his succession is to be postponed to agnate sapindas, such as a great-grandson of the paternal grandfather of the deceased owner.

5. The decisions of the Divisional Benches which have taken this latter view of the matter have, however, been questioned before us by Dr. Guru Das Banerji for the respondent, his contention being that if 'the principle of spiritual benefit which constitutes,' according to the Full Bench decision in the case of Guru Gobind Shaha, 'the fundamental basis of the Law of Inheritance propounded by the Dayabhaga,' is to be followed, the brother's daughter's son is entitled to preference as against the paternal grandfather's great grandson. This contention is mainly based upon the following considerations : First, that a brother's daughter's son offers three pindas to his maternal ancestors, in two of which the deceased owner participates; whereas the great grandson of the paternal grandfather offers only one pinda to his paternal ancestors, in which the deceased participates; second, that of the two pindas participated in by the deceased, as offered by the brother's daughter's son, one is offered to the father of the deceased; whereas no such pinda is offered by the grandfather's great grandson, but that the pinda he gives is to a remoter ancestor; third, that acoording to Dayakrama Sangraha, and various text-writers of modern times which have adopted the authority of that treatise, the brother's daughter's son is entitled to succeed after the father's daughter's son.

6. It has been further contended that the decision of Sir Richard Couch and Mr. Justice Ainslie in the case of Gobind Pershad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chmder Surmah Ghuttack 23 W.R. 117 : 15 B.L.R. 35 which is the foundation of the later decisions upon the same point, proceeds mainly upon a misreading of some of the observations of Mr. Justice Mitter in the Full Bench case in the case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose 13 W. R. F.B. 49 (57) : 5 B.L.R. 15.as to the comparative religious efficacy of pindas offered to maternal and paternal sides respectively ; and also upon the unsupported opinion of Jagannath Tarkapunch-anum in his treatise known as vivada Bhungarnuva as to the pindas offered to paternal ancestors being primary, and those offered to maternal ancestors being of secondary importance. It was further argued that-upon the same principle under which the daughter's son, father's daughter's son, grandfather's daughter's son and great grandfather's daughter's son succeed in preference to agnate sapindas of remoter lines, the brother's daughter's son is also entitled to preference as against the grandfather's great grandson.

7. The question raised before us, as already remarked, is indeed a difficult one, and the difficulty to our mind arises from the circumstances that the brother's daughter's son, although not mentioned anywhere in the Dayabhaga, as an heir, has been held by a Full Bench to he so, according to the principle of spiritual benefit as propounded by the Dayabhaga, without however assigning to him any definite position in the rank of heirs.

8.While recognizing, as laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose referred to above, that the law of succession propounded by the Dayabhaga is based upon the principle of spiritual benefit, several Divisional Benches of this Court found themselves unable to give to the brother's daughter's son a place above an agnate sapinda, such as the grandfather's great grandson. And we may say that ever since the year 1874, this Court has invariably followed one course, viz., it has recognized the latter as an heir preferential to the former. That being so, before we come to a different conclusion, and disturb the law as settled for so many years by those rulings, we should be perfectly satisfied that they are wrong.

9. Now, addressing ourselves in the first place to the question of spiritual benefit, we do not find in the Dayabhaga any express texts drawing any distinction as regards efficacy between pindas offered by heirs in the female line and those offered by heirs in the male line. All that it seems to lay down in substance is that the rule of succession is to be governed by the amount of spiritual benefit conferred upon the deceased, or upon his ancestors, by which he, the deceased, might himself be benefited by participation or otherwise. And one would not expect to find in a treatise like the Dayabhaga, which does not deal with the ceremonial part of the Hindu Law, any such details as to the comparative efficacy of the pindas offered by the agnate and cognate sapindas. But that a distinction like this does exist, and must have been present in the mind of the author of the Dayabhaga is disclosed by the fact that between an agnate sapinda and a cognate sapinda of equal degree of propinquity the former is preferred to the latter, although the latter is the giver of a larger number of cakes in which the deceased would participate than the former ; and also by the fact that agnate sapindas in any line are always preferred to the cognate sapindas of the same line. For instance, the father's son's son (i.e., a brother's son) of the deceased owner offers three pindas, one to his own father, and the other two to the grandfather and great grandfather respectively of the deceased, and in which two pindas only the latter participates. The father's daughter's son (i.e., a sister's son) offers three pindas, viz., to the father, grandfather and great grandfather of the deceased, and in all which pindas the latter participates. And yet the brother's son is preferential heir to the sister's son. Then, again, as between the father's great grandson (brother's grandson) and father's daughter's son (sister's son), the former is the preferential heir, although he is more removed from the father of the deceased, and offers only one pinda (i.e., to the father) in which the deceased participates, whereas the father's daughter's son offers a larger number of pindas in which the deceased participates.

10. That the pindas offered to paternal ancestors are primary, and those offered to maternal ancestors are secondary in importance, and that there is a difference between the efficacy of the two classes of pindas, is not only Laid down in distinct terms bv Jagannath (see vol. II, Colebrooke's Digest, p, 576), but is to be well deduced from Rughunundun's Sraddha Tattwa.

11. Referring to the subject of Parvana Sraddh, which, according to the ceremonial law, a Hindu is hound to perform in the case of a man who dies on the dav of amaboshya (new moon) or pretpukha (dark half of the lunar month of Bhadro), Rughunundun quotes in the first place the following text of Sankha : 'One who dies in amaboshya, or in the pretpukha, his annual sraddha should he performed in the parvana form after his sapindahurun (sixteenth sradh from the date of death), wherein oblation to the deceased is to be mixed with that of his father, grandfather and great grandfather.' And he then observes as follows:

Accordingly, when the annual sraddha of one who died in the pretpukha, &c;, is performed in the parvana form, no other parvana is to be again begun for the sake of the performance of the sraddh of the maternal grandfather, &c;, because the latter sraddha, depends upon the sraddha of the fathers as Laid down in the text of vrihaspati. 'Where fathers are worshipped the maternal grandfathers (are) surely to be (worshipped)' ; and also by the text: 'A wise man should in the same manner perform the sraddha of the maternal grandfather also.

In the same manner, if either of two step-brothers, living in commensality, performs sraddha in the parvana form, the other should not again perform the parvana sraddha of his maternal grandfathers. Hence it is also Laid down in Dwaitanirnava that, if a shagnikourush (the son begotten, who maintains a sacred fire) performs the sraddha of his three ancestors from father up to great-grandfather on the date of his father's death, he is not again to begin another parvana for performing the sraddha of his maternal grandfathers.' (Rughunundun's Sraddha Tattwa, Serampur Edition, p.160.)

12. There is also a passage in the Dattaka Chandrika which bears upon the same subject, and it is as follows:

In the same manner, as on the anniversary of the decease of a father (who died during the first half of aswina, denominated pretpukha) the ceremonials of a parvana rite having been contemplated in honour of the father and other two paternal ancestors in ascent above him, a parvana rite is not recommended on account of the funeral repast in honour of the maternal grandfather and other two male ancestors (on the mother's side); for the commencement of the same depends on the funeral repast in honour of the paternal ancestors (which, in this instance, would have been already completed).' (Dattaka Chandrika, Baboo Kishen Kishore's Ed., Section 1, v. 24.)

13. It has, however, been said that according to the principle, which is to be gathered from the Dayabbaga, the person who offers pindas, whether primary or. secondary, to the deceased, comes in first among the rank of heirs; that the succession then goes to the ascending line, viz., the father and those who offer pindas to him in the order of proximity ; and on failure of such heirs it goes to the grandfather and those who confer benefits on him, and then in like manner to the great-grandfather and his descendants; and that in this view of the matter, the brother's, daughter's son is entitled to succeed in preference to the grandfather's great-grandson, because the latter offers no pinda to the father of the deceased, whereas the latter does. And in this connection reliance is placed upon Dayabhaga, Oh. XI, Section 6, v. 5, which treats of the relative claims of the uncle and nephew of the deceased owner.

14. The principle as enunciated above may no doubt be well applied in a contest between two persons who present funeral cakes of the same description but there appears to be no authority that it also applies in a case where the rival claimants are presenters of cakes, primary and secondary, respectively. On the other hand, the contrary appears from the respective positions assigned in the Dayabhaga itself to the father, grandfather and great grandfather in relation to daughter's son, father's daughter's son and grandfather's daughter's son respectively. For instance according to the Dayabhaga, in default of daughter's son, the succession devolves on the father (see Colebrooke's Dayabhaga, Ch. XI, Section 3, v. 1 and 3), whereas, according to the contention now raised, there ought to come in after the daughter's son at least two other heirs, viz., the son's daughter's son and grandson's daughter's son, before the father can succeed. And similarly, according to the same contention, after the father's daughter's son, the brother's daughter's son, the brother's son's daughter's son ought to come in before the succession goes to the grandfather; whereas Oh. XL Section 6, v. 8 and 9, point to the contrary. The same remark applies to the relative position of grandfather's daughter's son and the great grandfather. But it has been contended that the expression ' daughter's son,' as occurring in Chap. XI, Section 3, v. 1, and Section 6, v. 8 and 9, should not be read literally as denoting the son of the daughter of the deceased or of the father or grandfather, but it ought to be read as including the daughter's son of the son and grandson of the deceased, and the father's son's daughter's son and grandson, and so on.

15. No valid reason has been adduced before us in support of the contention that in the above passages the expression 'daughter's son' should have a more extended signification than what it ordinarily bears. On the other hand, the well-known commentator Sree Krishna Tarkalunkar commenting on v. 34 to 37 of Section 6, Ch. XI of the Dayabhaga, gives a recapitulation of heirs, and he clearly understands the expression 'daughter's son' in its literal sense. It appears from several passages in the Dayabhaga it self that the expression 'daughter's son' was used in its literal sense. For instance, in Section 2, Ch. XI, v. 17, the author of the Dayabhaga says vrihas-pati recites the gift of the funeral oblation as the sole cause (of right) in the instance of both (the daughter and the grandson) 'as the ownership of her father's wealth devolves on her, although kindred exist, so her son like wise is acknowledged to be heir to his maternal grandfather's estate. 'As the daughter is heiress of her father's wealth in right of the funeral oblation which is to be presented by the daughter's son, so is the daughter's son owner of his maternal grandfather's estate in right of offering that oblation, notwithstanding the existence of kindered such as the father and others.' (Colebrooke's Dayabhaga, Ch. XI, Section 2, v. 17.)

16. Now it is clear from the above passage that the expression 'daughter's son' was used to denote only the daughter's son of the deceased owner, and not to include his son's daughter's son and grandson's daughter's son, because the text of vrihaspati cited above, and the observation made upon it by the author of the Dayabhaga, speak of 'his maternal grandfather's estate.' The pronoun 'his' cannot apply to the son's daughter's son, or the grandson's daughter's son, because it is followed by the words 'maternal grandfather,' and the deceased owner could not be characterized as the maternal grandfather of his son's daughter's son or grandson's daughter's son. The same observation applies to the text of Menu cited in v. 19 of the same chapter and section. The text says : 'Let the daughter's son take the whole estate of his own father who leaves no other son, and let him offer two funeral oblations-- one to his own father, the other to his maternal grandfather. Between a son's son and the son of a daughter there is no difference in law, since their father and mother both spring from the body of the same man.'

17. It is clear that this text cannot apply to the son's daughter's son or the grandson's daughter's son.

18. In Section 3, v. 3 of the same chapter, the author of the Dayabhaga, treating of the father's right of succession, says that his right 'should be after the daughter's son and before the mother, for the father, offering two oblations of food to other manes in which the deceased participates, is inferior to the daughter's son who presents one oblation to the deceased and two to other manes in which the deceased participates.'

19. Here the 'daughter's son' mentioned cannot include son's daughter's son or grandson's daughter's son, because neither of them presents 'one' oblation to the deceased, and two to other manes in which the deceased participates.

20. In v. 8, Section 6, Ch. XI, the author of the Dayabhaga says 'But on failure of heirs of the father down to the great grandson the succession devolves on the father's daughter's son (in preference to the uncle) in like manner as it descends to the owner's daughter's son (on failure of the male issue in preference to the brother).' (Colebrooke's Dayabhaga, Ch. XI, Section 6, v. 8.) The author here speaks of the 'owner's daughter's sons,' which expression cannot include his son's daughter's son and grandson's daughter's son.

21. For these reasons we are unable to give to the expression 'daughter's son,' as occurring in Section 3, Ch. XI, v. 1, an extended meaning as contended for. In like manner we do not think that the expression 'the daughter's son' in Ch. XI, Section 8, v. 8 and 9, could be stretched as to include father's son's (i.e., brother's) daughter's son, and grandfather's son's daughter's son.

22. Reliance was also placed before us upon the Commentary of Srinath Acharya Chudamony on Ch. XI, Section 4, v. 4 to 6, which treat of the succession in default of the mother 'together with her offspring.' There are two readings of the said commentary one is as follows:

Here the phrase 'together with her offspring,' implying even a brother's daughter's son, the heritable right of the grandfather, is expressly mentioned.

23. The other reading is Though the word 'offspring' in the expression (sic) (sasantana) 'together with her offspring' may include the brother's daughter's son, yet it is said that the grandfather is to succeed.

24. But whatever may be the correct reading, and although it be that the expression 'together with her offspring' may imply or include a brother's daughter's son, still there can be no doubt that according to the Dayabhaga, as understood by Srinath himself, the grandfather succeeds in preference to the brother's daughter's son.

25. It was further contended that the translation, as given by Mr. Colebrooke to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section 6, Ch. XI, is not quite correct. But' taking the translation as it was contended for, we do not think that, so for as the author of the Dayabhaga was concerned, it was his intention to place the brother's daughter's son just after the father's daughter's son ; but on the contrary, reading v. 8, 9 and 10 together, it would appear that he intended to say that the succession of the grandfather and great grand father respectively, their sons, grandsons and great-grandsons, as also their daughter's sons, would be in the same order as in the case of the father, his son, grandson and great-grandson, and his daughter's son, as laid down in the earlier parts of the same chanter; and in this view the brother's daughter's son would find no place just after the father's daughter's son.

26. Stress was also placed before us upon Dayatattwa, Oh. XI, para 64. But as to this there are two readings; one is as follows:

Accordingly, as on failure of the deceased proprietor's lineage, including the daughter's son, others succeed, similarly in default of the brother's son, the father's lineage ending with his (or the) daughter's son takes the heritage.

27. Another reading is : 'As in default of one's own lineage, ending with daughter's son, another is entitled, so in default of brother's son, ending with his daughter's son, the father's lineage is entitled.'

28. These two different readings are due to two different editions of the above work. We have been unable to discover which of those editions is correct; and we do not therefore think that we should be justified in acting upon either of them.

29. The last argument that was raised in this connection was with reference to the construction of v. 12, Section 6, Ch. XI. It was said that according to this verse, in defult of the lineal descendants of the paternal great-grandfather, including the daughter's son, the maternal uncle and the other heirs in the maternal line succeed, and that therefore the brother's daughter's son has no place at all, if be is to come in after the agnate sapindas. But the Full Bench in the case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose 13 W.R. (F.B.) 49 : 5 B.L.R. 15 considered v. 19 of the same section, and from the reasons given therein came to the conclusion that the word '&c;,' after the expression 'father's daughter's son' in that verse is comprehensive enough to include such relatives who are, like the father's daughter's son, competent to offer oblations to the paternal ancestors of the deceased. This conclusion virtually overrules the contention raised before us as to v. 12.

30. We observe that Jagannath, the author of Vivad Bhungarnuva, while commenting upon v. 20, Section 6, Ch. XT, and which is substantially the same as v. 12, referred to above, advocates the claim of, among others, the brother's daughter's son, &c.; (See Colabrooka's Digest, vol. II, p. 567.) And this leads us to suppose that the words as used in v. 12 do not debar a brother's daughter's son from claiming succession in preferenee to the maternal uncle, &c.;

31. We have next to consider the passage in the Davakrama Sangraha favouring the claim of the brother's daughter's son as entitled to succeed immediately after the father's daughter's son. It was contended, as already mentioned, that there were several copies of this treatise in existence which contained the above passage, and that it was not right in this Court to hold in the case of Govindo Hureekar v. Womesh Chunder 'Roy W.R.F.B. 176 that it was an interpolation. Now, in the first place, it must be observed that SriKrishna Tarkalunkar, the author of the said treatise, while recapitulating in his commentary the order of succession according to the Dayabhaga, did not mention the brother's daughter's son, or the uncle's daughter's son, who are mentioned in certain conies of the Dayakrama Sangraha as heirs. And if these conies are correct, how is it that we do not find any mention made of many other cognate sapindas, such as son's daughter's son, grandson's daughter's son, brother's son's daughter's son, and others who occupy positions analogous to that which a brother's daughter's son and uncle's daughter's son occupy. That being so, it seems to us that the passages in the Dayakrama Sangraha that are relied upon are of doubtful authority, and that we should not be justified in acting upon them. And if we cannot act upon these passages, it follows that. we cannot accept the opinion expressed by certain modern writers based upon the authority of the Dayakrama Sangraha.

32. As regards the argument pressed upon us that the decision of Sir Richard Couch in Govind Pershad Talookdar v. Mohesh Ghunder Surmah Ghuttack 23 W.R. 117 : 15 B.L.R. 35 proceeds upon a misreading of the remarks of Mr. Justice Mitter in the Full Bench case of Gooroo Gobind Shaha v. Anund Lal Ghose it seems to us that there is some force in it. Mr. Justice Mitter, as we understand him, in the passage quoted by Sir Richard Couch in page 47 (15 B.L.R.) and relied upon in the following page, referred evidently to the pindas offered to the paternal ancestors of the deceased in which he participated, and pindas offered to his maternal ancestors which he, the deceased, was bound to offer, but in which he does not participate. And in speaking of these two classes of pindas, Mr. Justice Mitter observed that the former were of superior religious efficacy. He did not apparently mean to refer to the giver of the pindas hut to the deceased, while he alluded to the efficacy of the pindas as offered to the paternal and maternal ancestors, respectively.

33. But however that may be, this inaccuracy does not affect the true merits of the conclusion at which Sir Richard Couch arrived ; for if there be a difference as to the efficacy of the two classes of pindas offered by a person to his paternal and maternal ancestors, respectively, there can be very little doubt that the decision cannot be impeached, although some of the reasons given may be questioned.

34. With reference to the argument that was pressed upon us that upon the same principle, viz., of spiritual benefit, according to which the daughter's son, father's daughter's son, grandfather's daughter's son and great-grandfather's daughter's son succeed in preference to agnate sapindas of remoter lines, a brother's daughter's son is entitled to preference as against the grandfather's great grandson, we have to observe that it is no doubt true that the spiritual benefit conferred upon the deceased by the daughter's son, father's daughter's son, &c;, is mentioned by the author of the Dayabhaga as the cause for their succession ; but there are several passages in the Dayabhaga itself which clearly indicate that it is not the only cause. Referring to Ch. XI, Section 2, v. 19 and 20 (Colebrooke's Dayabhaga), we find that the author says as follows:

Accordingly Menu propounds the daughter's origin from the person of the maternal grandfather as the reason of the daughter's son having a right to the succession, not her appointment to raise a son; else he would have specified this cause. Let the daughter's son take the whole estate of his own father who leaves no (other) son, and let him offer two funeral oblations, one to his own father, the other to his maternal grandfather. Between a son's son and the son of a daughter there is no difference in law, since their father and mother both sprung from the body of the same man.

Thus this very author expressly declares that the daughter's son, born of one not appointed to continue the male line, has the right of succession. 'By that male child, whom a daughter, whether formally appointed or not, shall produce from a husband of an equal class, the maternal grandfather becomes in law the father of a son. Let that son give the funeral oblation and possess the inheritance'.

35. In the above passages it is expressly mentioned that 'between a son's son and the son of a daughter there is no difference in law,' and that the maternal grandfather becomes in law the father of a son.

36. Then again the Dayabhaga, referring to the succession of the father's daughter's son in Ch. XI, Section 6, v. 8 and 9, says as follows:

But on failure of heirs of the father down to the great-grandson it must be understood that the succession devolves on the father's daughter's son (in preference to the uncle) in like manner as it descends to the owner's daughter's son (on failure of the male issue) in preference to the brother. The succession of the grandfather's and great-grandfather's lineal descendants, including the daughter's son, must be understood in a similar manner, according to the proximity of the funeral offering, since the reason stated in the text--'for even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next world, like the son of a son--is equally applicable; and his father's or grandfather's daughter's son, like his own daughter's son, transports his manes over the abyss by offering oblations of which he may partake.

37. In the above passages the author says : 'In like manneras it descends in the owner's daughter's son: 'and' since the reason stated in the text--'for even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next world, like the son of a son'--is equally applicable,' the special reasons stated in the verses quoted are not applicable to a brother's daughter's son, uncle's daughter's son, &c.;

38. Upon all these considerations we are unable to hold that the plaintiff, who is a brother's daughter's son, is a preferential heir to the defendants, who are the great-grandsons of the paternal grandfather of the deceased Nobin Chunder.

39. The result is that this appeal will be allowed with costs.


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