S.N. Guha Ray, J.
1. This Rule was issued on the opposite parties Haridas Das and Jatish Kumar Seal calling upon them to show cause why a complaint should not be made against them for having committed an offence under Section 211, I. P. C., and under any other appropriate Section in connection with an application made by the Opposite Parties for proceeding for contempt against the present petitioners Dasarathi Mandal and others.
2. The facts briefly were that there was a temporary injunction against the present petitioners restraining them from disturbing the possession of the opposite parties in ' certain parcels of land forming the subject-matter of Title Suit No. 12 of 1954 in the 1st Court of the Munsif at Sealdah for declaration that the right, title and interest of the opposite parties therein had not been affect ed by certain sales in execution of certain rent decrees and for other consequential reliefs.
3. The application for contempt alleged among other things that the opposite parties accompanied by hired men numbering about 100 Goondas armed with lethal weapons attempted to enter forcibly into the properties which were the subject-matter of the suit and in the course of such attempt broke open the gate, cut down one tree and also 'broke down the gate'. The Rule for contempt was discharged on a finding that the story that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate and cut down one tree could not reasonably be believed. The question now is whether the Court should make a complaint against the opposite parties for having made these false allegations.
4. Mr. Panda appearing on behalf of the opposite parties argues that Section 211, I. P, C, is not applicable because Section 211, I. P. C., applied only where a criminal proceeding is instituted and in support of this proposition has relied upon Queen Empress v. Karigowda, ILR 19 Bom 51; in which it was observed that
'the words 'falsely charging' used in Section 211, I. P. C., must be construed along with the words which speak of the 'institution of proceedings' and that these words are obviously used in a technical and exclusive sense, and by parity of reasoning, the same restricted sense must be given to the words which relate to a false charge.' With due deference to their Lordships we are unable to accept this narrow construction of Section 211, I. P. C. If the Legislature had intended that the words 'falsely charging', should be read 'ejusdem generis' with the words that precede viz., 'institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding', there was hardly any necessity for using the expression 'or falsely charges' be cause that would have been covered by the words that precede them, namely, 'institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding.' The meaning of the expression 'falsely charges' is simply 'falsely accuses', and as the Section stands, there is no necessity of this false accusation being made in connection with a criminal proceeding. In that view, if the opposite parties made allegations that the present petitioners committed an offence and if these allegations were false, they are liable to be prosecuted under Section 211, I. P. C., provided of course, their intention was to injure the petitioners.
5. The distinct finding of this Court in the Rule for contempt was that these allegations were false. Of course, there is no finding at all as to whether the intention of the opposite parties was to injure the petitioners. But, if such false alienations were made in connection with an application for contempt, it is at once obvious that these allegations were made in order that the Court might be persuaded to take action against the petitioners in contempt. That would certainly have constituted an injury to the petitioners. From that point of view it must be held that there was an intention on the part of the opposite par ties to cause injury to the petitioners by falsely accusing them of having committed certain of fences.
6. We are of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint should be made. The Rule is accordingly made absolute and the Registrar Appellate Side is directed to file a complaint against the opposite parties under Section 211, I. P. C., Section 199, I. P. C., and under any other appropriate Section to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta.
N. K. Sen, J.
7. I entirely agree with the order that has been passed by my learned brother but I would only wish to point out that statements made on oath on affidavits sworn before courts are acted upon and generally accepted by Courts. The sanctity of oath must be observed at all costs. The parties concerned must not make statements lightly or falsely in the hope that Courts will not take any serious view of those statements if they are found to be false or incorrect. Any person making a statement on oath must take the fullest responsibility for it and must accept all consequences thereof. As has been pointed out by my learned brother, we are not prepared in this case to let the opposite parties get out without facing a trial.