1. The only question which arises in this appeal is, whether the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit that was brought for recovery of rent under Act X of 1859.
2. The lease, with which we are concerned, was a lease for mining purposes and for purposes of building, making roads and so forth, the land not being demised for agricultural or horticultural purposes. Section 23, Clause 4, Act X of 1859, speaks of ' suits for arrears of rent due on account of land either kheraji or lakheraj, or on account of any rights of pasturage, forest rights, fisheries or the like.' The word ' land,' as used in this seotion, has been construed in various decisions of this Court see, amongst others, the case of Raniganj Coal Association v. Judoo Nath Ghose (1892) I.L.R. 19 Cal. 489 to refer to any land granted for agricultural or horticultural purposes, and not to land granted for purposes such as are mentioned in the lease upon which the suit is founded. In this view of the matter it is obvious that the suit could not be taken cognizance of under Act X of 1859.
3. The learned Vakil for the appellants has, however, contended that the words 'or the like' in the section would include rights such as those that were demised by the lease in question. We are, however, unable to accept that view. Those words must be taken ejusdem generis with the rights spoken of in the said section and it could hardly be contended that the right of taking coal from the land demised and such other rights demised were covered by the words' or the like ' in the section in question.
4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.