1. This suit has been decided adversely to the plaintiffs on the ground that it is barred by what is commonly called the special law of limitation, that is, the law of limitation as prescribed by the Bengal Tenancy Act. It seems to be overlooked at times, in applying the provisions of that Act, that it is one to amend and consolidate certain enactments relating to landlord and tenant and that, as its preamble shows, what was regarded as expedient was to amend and consolidate certain enactments relating to landlord and tenant.
2. Section 184 of the Act prescribes certain rules of limitation by a reference to the Schedule. But Section 184 as also Chapter XVI, of which it is a part, is but a portion of this Code which governs the relations of landlord and tenant. In determining what Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act means, we must not leave out of sight the purpose and scope of the Act. It was not the design of the Act, as I understand it, to deprive a tenant of the rights that he otherwise possesses against a third person between whom and himself there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. It was only intended to deal with such rights as existed between landlord and tenant.
3. I am aware that very extended operation has been attributed to Article 3, in one case at any rate. But that is contrary to the general current of decisions and to the spirit of the Act. To deprive a tenant of his right of suit there must be a plain dispossession within the meaning of Article 3 of the Schedule. Bearing in mind what it was that the Act did intend, in my opinion there is no justification here for saying that there was such a dispossession as the learned Subordinate Judge in reversal of the Munsif has thought fit to find Therefore, his decree must be set aside and the case must go back to the lower Appellate Court, in order that it may there be determined on the merits apart from the special Jaw of limitation which has no application.
4. Costs will follow the result.