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Amulya Chandra Bhaduri Vs. Satis Chandra Giri and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectContempt of Court
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1932Cal255,136Ind.Cas.901
AppellantAmulya Chandra Bhaduri
RespondentSatis Chandra Giri and ors.
Excerpt:
contempt of court - pleadings--duty of complainant to allege grounds specifically--affidavits--source of information not disclosed--value of statements. - .....of the admittedly debuttar estate attached to the tarakeswar temple made an application to the district judge of hooghly praying that proceedings in contempt might be taken against the above-named persons inasmuch as they had been attempting to impede and stultify the administration by the receiver of the debuttar estate by resorting to improper and unlawful means and artifices, as they had been guilty of direct illegal obstruction offered to the officers in the discharge of their lawful duties, as they had used criminal force and criminal intimidation under the circumstances stated in the petition or report of the receiver and as they had been guilty of offering insults and threats to the receiver and the officers under him. the district judge thereupon issued notices upon the.....
Judgment:

1. This is a Rule calling upon four persons named Satish Chandra Giri, Probhat Giri, Narendra Samanta and Gobordhone Kamle to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt. The circumstances under which the present Rule came to be issued, shortly stated, are as follows: It appears that some time in February 1930 the receiver of the admittedly debuttar estate attached to the Tarakeswar temple made an application to the District Judge of Hooghly praying that proceedings in contempt might be taken against the above-named persons inasmuch as they had been attempting to impede and stultify the administration by the receiver of the debuttar estate by resorting to improper and unlawful means and artifices, as they had been guilty of direct illegal obstruction offered to the officers in the discharge of their lawful duties, as they had used criminal force and criminal intimidation under the circumstances stated in the petition or report of the receiver and as they had been guilty of offering insults and threats to the receiver and the officers under him. The District Judge thereupon issued notices upon the persons concerned and called upon them to show cause why they should not be proceeded against in contempt.

2. A number of witnesses were examined before the District Judge on the side of the receiver as also on the side of the persons concerned and a number of records from the Magisterial and other Courts were admitted in evidence, and finally the District Judge came to the conclusion on 9th January 1931 after a prolonged inquiry that it has been established to his satisfaction that the persons concerned had been guilty of various acts of contempt. He thereupon referred the matter to this Court for taking such proceedings against the said persons as this Court thought proper under the provisions of Act 12 of 1926. The matter came before my learned brothers, Lort-Williams, J. and S.K. Ghose, J., who were then presiding over the Criminal Bench and which Bench ha 1 been authorized by the learned Chief Justice to deal with and dispose of the reference made by the District Judge of Hooghly. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that a Rule had to be issued upon the persons concerned and that such Rule should be issued on the petition or report of the receiver made to the District Judge and the affidavit in support thereof. They expressed the view that one of the parties to the litigation should have moved in the matter, but, inasmuch as that had not been done, they thought it expedient in the circumstances appearing before them to issue a Rule on the report or petition of the receiver to the District Judge treating the same as if it was a petition to this Court. That Rule has now come on for hearing before us.

3. We have examined such portions of the record as have been brought to our notice. It is quite clear that the only allegations which Satish Chandra Giri and the three other persons named above are called upon to answer are the allegations made in the petition or report of the receiver to the District Judge which petition or report was treated as if it was a petition to this Court and the affidavit in support thereof. Confining ourselves therefore to the grounds upon which the present Rule has been issued and which are the only grounds that the opposite parties are called upon to answer, it is to be observed that the affidavit in support of the report or petition of the receiver is singularly lacking in precision.

4. So far as paras. A and B are concerned, it is no doubt stated in the affidavit that the said paragraphs refer to matters of record and that the same are true to the knowledge of the deponent, namely, the receiver; but, as regards paras. C and D, it may be stated at once that we cannot take any notice whatsoever of the matters mentioned in para. D because the affidavit says that the matters mentioned therein are true to the information of the deponent. The source of the information is not disclosed and, as is laid down in various cases, we are unable to, take any notice whatsoever of matters which are stated to be true to information, but in respect of which the source of the information is not disclosed. As regards para. C, it is stated that the earlier portion of the paragraph is true to information. The remarks we have just made as regards para. D apply to the same, bat we have not been able to make out what are the earlier paragraphs which are referred to nor has Mr. Basu who appears in support of the present Rule been able to enlighten us as to which portions of para. C are referred to in the affidavit in question. The result therefore is that the petitioner on whose petition the present Rule has been issued must be limited to grounds A and B.

5. As regards grounds A and B, it is true that certain matters of record have been referred to, but the position is that those matters of record have been set out in such a manner as to justify the conclusion that the opposite parties have not been able to know with any amount of precision the particular acts of contempt with which they are charged in the petition. In cases of this nature, as is well known, the practice of the Court is to enable the parties concerned to know what are the points they have got to answer in a charge of contempt and the practice has always been that the opposite parties, namely, the parties charged with contempt cannot be called upon to answer to anything which is not set out specifically in the 'grounds used before the Court at the time when the Rule was issued. The relevant practice and procedure are set out in the Annual Practice and there is no doubt whatsoever that, in matters of this nature, the Court has to proceed very (carefully and cautiously. The liberty of the subject is concerned and it is not (enough that, because a Rule has been issued therefore the Rule has got to be (determined in only one particular manner {without the Court examining the grounds on which the rule has been issued. We are of opinion that the grounds in this case are insufficient and in the circumstances the only course that is left open to us is to discharge the present Rule.

6. Nothing that we have said will prevent any of the parties to the litigation which is the subject-matter of an appeal to this Court at the present moment to move and apply for suitable orders, should they be so advised.

7. Mr. H.D. Bose on behalf of the Mohunt asked for costs. But, in the circumstances, we are of opinion that there should be no order for costs.


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