1. The question raised in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, having sued for enhanced rent for the year 1286 (1879), can now sue for the original rent for the years 1284, 1285 and 1286 (1877, 1878, and 1879).
2. The lower Appellate Court has found that the one action is no bar to the other. We feel it impossible to concur in this opinion. It appears to us that, looking at the wording of Sections 42 and 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clearly the intention of the Legislature that plaintiffs should bring their entire claim and every remedy enforceable in respect of that claim into Court at once, and that if they fail to do that in any suit, they cannot afterwards avail themselves of any other remedy on which they have not chosen to insist in the first suit.
3. It is true that the Privy Council have pointed out that a suit for enhanced rent and a suit for rent are very different proceedings. None the less are they, in our opinion, remedies or claims arising in respect of the same subject-matter. This being so, we think they fall within the purview of Section 43, and that the plaintiff, not having chosen to put forward this claim for rent of the years 1284, 1285 and 1286 at the original rate in the former suit, is now barred from suing for that rent in the present suit. We think, therefore, that the decision of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and that the suit must be dismissed with costs throughout.