P.N. Mookerjee, J.
1. This Rule must fail on a preliminary ground.
2. The Rule is directed against an order of the learned Registrar, Appellate Side, of this Court, acting as the Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court-Fees Act, deciding a dispute between the appellant and the Stamp Reporter of this Court as to the amount of court-fees, payable on the memorandum of the present appeal.
3. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the facts of this case in any detail or the merits of the appellant's contention that his memorandum was duly stamped and the Taxing Officer was wrong in demanding further court-fees from him.
4. The Rule was obtained under Article 227 of the Constitution, and the question is whether the Registrar, acting as the Taxing Officer, is a tribunal whose orders are revisable by this Court in the exercise of its powers under that Article.
5. In our opinion, the answer should be in the negative. The Registrar is an officer of this Court and forms part of it and, when he is appoint-ed the Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act, he does not cease to be so. In that capacity also he acts as an officer, to wit, the Taxing Officer, of this Court and as part of it, and discharges or performs one of its essential functions. It is really the Court which acts through the Registrar as its Taxing Officer in the matter of determination of proper court-fees, payable on documents, filed be fore it. The function may not be strictly administrative, and it may be quasi-judicial or even judicial, but whoever discharges it does so as part of and/or for or on behalf of this Court. If that be so, the authority concerned cannot be regarded as a tribunal, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227. Under that Article the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over itself and the tribunal, amenable to it under that Article, must be apart from it. That Article was never meant to authorise the High Court to revise its own decision or the decision of a tribunal, acting for it or as part of it. For that purpose recourse must be had to some other appropriate provision of law, if any. If the Registrar, acting as Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act, be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Taxing Judge under that section, performing similar functions would also be similarly amen able and then we will have the spectacle of a Bench or even a single Judge (where the valuation is below Rs. 2,000/-) of this Court, revising orders of one of its Judges, acting as a Taxing Judge. That was certainly not intended by the Constitution.
6. The Full Bench case of the Patna High Court, reported in Krishna Mohan Sinha v. Raghunandan Pandey, ILR 4 Pat 336: (AIR 1925 Pat 392), amply supports the view, we have taken above, of the position of the Registrar, acting as Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act, when it says that he is an officer to whom the High Court's duties and powers of deciding disputes between suitors and the officer whose duly it is to see that proper court-fees are paid on documents, filed before the High Court, are delegated under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act (vide p. 354 of ILR 4 Pat): (at p. 397 of AIR)). We do not also, regard the observations of Beaumont C. J., in Mohanlal Narottamdas v. Keshavlal Narottamdas, AIR 1943 Bom 441 at p. 442 as holding that the Registrar, acting as Taxing Officer under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act, is not acting for the High Court or as part of it, even though the learned Chief Justice says that, as Taxing Officer, the Registrar is acting not as an officer of the Court but as a (special) officer, nominated by the statute.
7. In the above view, we discharge this Rule but we would make no order for costs.
8. The appellant is permitted to pay the deficit court-fees within two months from this date.
P.K. Sarkar, J.
9. I agree.