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Durga Prosad Pathak Vs. Lachman Bania - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1913)ILR40Cal584
AppellantDurga Prosad Pathak
RespondentLachman Bania
Cases ReferredDarbari Mandar v. Jagoo Lal
Excerpt:
sanction for prosecution - second sanction--criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), section 195--subsequent order, only a repetition of the first order--revival of proceedings--penal code (act xlv of 1860), sections 193, 471--limitation. - .....first sanction; and, fourthly, that the second sanction was illegal, inasmuch as it extends the period of limitation, which is to be calculated from the original date of sanction.2. as regards the first three grounds, it is only necessary to point out that there was no second sanction, and all the rulings which have been cited to us by the learned counsel, of which we need only refer to that in the case of darbari mandar v. jagoo lal (1) (1895) i.l.r. 22 calc. 573. clearly lay down that there can be no second sanction, and that any subsequent order purporting to be a second sanction must be taken to be nothing more than a repetition of the first, and that the period of limitation will run from the date of the first sanction.3. the fourth ground is that by this alleged second sanction.....
Judgment:

Holmwood and Chapman, JJ.

1. This Rule was issued upon four grounds: first, that the Small Cause Court had no power to grant a subsequent sanction, one having already been granted on the 27th July, 1912, which sanction had not been cancelled by a-higher Court; secondly, that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction in granting a second sanction without giving any notice to the petitioner; thirdly, that the Small Cause Court Judge acted without jurisdiction in granting a second sanction; inasmuch as a prosecution was started and was pending in the Police Court upon the first sanction; and, fourthly, that the second sanction was illegal, inasmuch as it extends the period of limitation, which is to be calculated from the original date of sanction.

2. As regards the first three grounds, it is only necessary to point out that there was no second sanction, and all the rulings which have been cited to us by the learned Counsel, of which we need only refer to that in the case of Darbari Mandar v. Jagoo Lal (1) (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calc. 573. clearly lay down that there can be no second sanction, and that any subsequent order purporting to be a second sanction must be taken to be nothing more than a repetition of the first, and that the period of limitation will run from the date of the first sanction.

3. The fourth ground is that by this alleged second sanction the period of limitation is extended; but as we have just pointed out it is not extended in any way. But the question does not arise in this case, because, as a matter of fact, the revival of proceedings in the Criminal Court took place within two months of the original sanction. As regards the question of the propriety of the revival of the Criminal Court, that was considered by the learned Judges who issued the Rule. It formed the fifth ground of the petition, and the learned Judges, after considering, rejected it and did not issue any Rule. That question, therefore, can not be raised again.

4. We are bound to hold that the Presidency Magistrate was within his jurisdiction in reviving these proceedings, as it appears clear on the record that he was, and the Rule must be discharged simply on the ground that there was no second sanction, and that the proceedings were taken within the period of limitation.


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