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Laxmi Narayan Saha Vs. Durgapada Karmakar and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtKolkata High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Rule No. 97 of 1980
Judge
Reported inAIR1981Cal352,85CWN840
ActsWest Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 - Sections 13(1), 17(1), 17(2), 17(2A) and 17(2B)
AppellantLaxmi Narayan Saha
RespondentDurgapada Karmakar and ors.
Appellant AdvocateBhaskar Ghosh, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateSyama Charan Mitter and ;Syama Prasanna Roy Chowdhury, Advs.
DispositionRevision allowed
Cases ReferredNew Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram
Excerpt:
- .....against the present petitioner in the 2nd court of the munsif, katwa for ejecting him from the suit premises, inter alia, on the allegation that the defendant-petitioner had committed default in payment of rents from magh, 1375 b. s. to shravan, 1385 b. s. and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under section 13 (1) (i) of the west bengal premises tenancy act, 1956. he has also prayed for eviction of the defendant tenant on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and also for building and rebuilding within the meaning of clauses (f) and (if) of section 13 (1) of the said act. 2. after entering appearance in the said suit on december 19, 1978, the defendant tenant made a combined application under sub-sections (2) and (2-a) (b) of.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.

1. The landlord opposite party has instituted a suit against the present petitioner in the 2nd Court of the Munsif, Katwa for ejecting him from the suit premises, inter alia, on the allegation that the defendant-petitioner had committed default in payment of rents from Magh, 1375 B. S. to Shravan, 1385 B. S. and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under Section 13 (1) (i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He has also prayed for eviction of the defendant tenant on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and also for building and rebuilding within the meaning of Clauses (f) and (if) of Section 13 (1) of the said Act.

2. After entering appearance in the said suit on December 19, 1978, the defendant tenant made a combined application under Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) (b) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He, inter alia, alleged that a part of the arrears of rent had already become barred by limitation and that he was only liable to deposit or pay arrears of rent for a period of three years preceding the date of the institution of the suit. He prayed that the said dispute about the total amount of arrears of rent may be determined by the Court. He also prayed that he may be allowed to pay by monthly instalments the amount which may be determined as due and payable by him. The plaintiff landlord opposed the said application of the defendant tenant under Sub-sections (2) and (2A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act The learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Katwa by his Order No. 26 dated 12th November, 1979 has rejected the aforesaid application of the defendant tenant under Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

3. The defendant tenant has obtained the present Rule under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the said order of the trial Court dated 12th November, 1979. The learned Munsif had committed an error apparent on the face of the record by holding that the defendant tenant's application under Section 17 (2) and (2-A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was not filed within the time specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act. Mr. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party, has fairly conceded that the defendant tenant had in fact made the aforesaid application within one month of the date of the service of summons upon him. The learned Munsif clearly committed an error apparenton the face of the record by observing that the defendant tenant had filed the application in question on 12th December, 1979 whereas the learned Munsif disposed of the said application on 12th November, 1979. In fact, the said application was filed on December 19, 1978. I accordingly set aside the finding of the learned Munsif that the defendant tenant's aforesaid application under Section 17 (2) and (2-A) of the Act was barred by limitation. But the learned Munsif, however, was not in error when he held that as the defendant tenant did not deposit or pay the arrears of rent not barred by limitation and which were admittedly due, his prayer under Section 17 (2) for determination of the dispute about the amount of arrears of rent was bound to be rejected in limine.

4. The defendant tenant had no doubt raised a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by contending that a portion of the arrears of rent due from him had become barred by limitation and therefore were irrecoverable. The defendant tenant admitted that the plaintiff was his landlord and that he was a defaulter in payment of rents at the rate mentioned in the plaint. But within the time specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 17, he did not deposit in Court the amount which was admitted by him to be due from him and was not barred by limitation together with his application under Section 17 (2) of the Act for determination of the rent payable. When he was disputing that as the rent barred by limitation was not payable by him, the defendant tenant was not required to deposit rent for the said disputed period pending the determination under Section 17 (2) of the Act. But without depositing the amount admitted by him to be due and not time barred, his prayer for determination of the rent payable was not maintainable in law.

5. The learned Munsif was patently wrong when he held that as the defendant tenant's prayer under Section 17 (2) could not be enteretained, his other prayer under Section 17 (2-A) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act must also fail. As already observed, it is now conceded by the plaintiff opposite party that the application of the defendant tenant under Section 17 (2) and (2-A) was in fact filed within the time specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act. The Sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 provides, inter alia, 'notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) on the application of the tenant, the Court may by order'-- (a) extend the time for depositor payment of any amounts referred to in Sub-section (i) or Sub-section (2) of Section 17 and (b) permit the tenant to deposit or pay such amount in such instalments and by such dates as the Court may fix. In other words, irrespective of the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17, a defendant tenant may apply either for extension of the time specified in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 17 for deposit or payment of the amount referred to therein or pray for instalments of the total sums required to be deposited or paid under Sub-section (1) of Section 17. The Section 17 (2-B) only prescribes the time limit for making applications under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 17 (2-A) of the Act. Thus, Sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 overrides the provisions in Sub-sections (1) and (2) relating to the time specified for making deposits or payments When an application, under Section 17 (2) is not entertained on the ground that the defendant tenant did not deposit the amount admitted by him to be due, his other prayer under Section 17 (2-A) (b) of the Act cannot be automatically dismissed. In the event such a prayer under Section 17 (2-A) (b) has been made within the time as specified in Section 17 (2-B). The Court is under a statutory duty to consider the circumstances of the tenant and also that of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under Sub-section (1) on account of default in payment of rent and to permit the tenant to pay or deposit the total sum due by such dates as the Court may fix. When the trial Court permits the tenant to pay by instalments, under the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 17 (2-A) it is required to make the calculations of the amount payable up to the month previous to that in which the order under Section 17 (2-A) is made. Therefore, until the Court under Section 17 (2-A) (b) calculates the total amount to be deposited, there could be no question of the tenant depositing or paying the arrear rents admitted by him to be due.

6. In the above view, the trial Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by rejecting in limine the defendant tenant's prayer for allowing him to pay or deposit by instalments the amount of arrear rents payable by him under Section 17 (1) of the Act.

7. I have already mentioned that in his aforesaid application the defendant tenant had raised a plea that a part of the arrear rent had become barred by limitation and, therefore, he was not required to deposit or pay the said time barred portion of thearrear rent. The learned Munsif has neither decided whether or not at the date of the institution of the suit any part of the arrear rent had become barred by limitation nor has made any calculations in terms of the proviso to Section 17 (2-A) (b) of the Act. Mr. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party has drawn my attention to the decision of Anil Kumar Sen and B. C. Chakravarti, JJ. in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Nath Dutta, : AIR1980Cal114 . The said Division Bench, inter alia, held that the decision of Bachawat and Chatterji, J.J. in Raghunath Singh v. Patel & Co., (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093, and also the Single Bench decision in N. N. Ghosh Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakra-borty, ILR (1976) 2 Cal 359, by implication stand overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Sri Ramchandraji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 237. Their Lordships further held that Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act quite clearly requires the tenant to deposit or pay the rent for the entire period for which he may have made default irrespective of whether any part of it was irrecoverable being barred by law or not.

8. In my view, the ratio of the decision in the Central Coalfields Ltd's case (supra), does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, I am required to consider the provisions of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Although the Central Coalfields Ltd.'s case (supra), arose out of an application made under Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Division Bench did not discuss the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 and did not expressly lay down that in the event of a determination under Section 17 (2) the Court is bound to direct the tenant to deposit the time-barred arrear rents. The Division Bench also did not decide whether in making a calculation under proviso to Section 17 (2-A) (b), the Court ought to include those amounts which had become time barred at the dale of the institution of the suit. Their Lordships in the Central Coalfields Ltd's case (supra), confined their decision to the interpretation of Section 17 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. But, in the present case, I have to ascertain the scope and effect of Section 17 (2-A) (b) proviso of the Act of 1956.

9. The Supreme Court in the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case : [1978]2SCR249 (supra), had considered the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Supreme Court in the said case had no occasion to interpret Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 1956. Naturally, the Supreme Court did not examine the correctness of the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Raghunath Singh's case ((1961) 65 Cal WN 1093) (supra). Therefore, unless by necessary implication the decision in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), stands over-ruled, the said Division Bench decision in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), still continues to be a binding precedent until it is over-ruled by a larger Bench of this Court or by any decision of the Supreme Court expressly or by necessary implication.

10. In my view the decision in the khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case : [1978]2SCR249 (supra) is distinguishable because the pronouncements in the said case were made in the context of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 which is not in pari materia with Section 17 (1) read with Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Kailasam, J. at page 288 of the reports has set out the substance of the different Sub-sections of Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act. The Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 provided :

''In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with the interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground.'

The said Supreme Court appeal was preferred against the judgment of Satish Chandra. J. of the Allahabad High Court reported in : AIR1977All399 , where the full facts have been set out. The landlord had filed an ejectment suit under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act. 1972 against the tenant, the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust in theCourt of the Small Causes on the ground of non-payment of rent in spite of service of a notice of demand. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment, inter alia, upon the finding that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent from January, 1963 to December. 1970. A notice demanding payment of rent as well as to quit the accommodation was served upon the tenant but the tenant did not make any payment towards the arrear rent. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant-tenant had deposited rent from 1st May, 1973 to 28th February, 1975. Satish Chandra, J. dismissed the revision case preferred by the tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed the said decision. In the Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (supra), the question was whether the expression in Section 20 (4), 'the entire amount of rent and damages..... due from him', included arrears of rent, the recovery of which had become barred by time. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court that the Section 20 (4) of U. P. Urban 'Buildings Etc. Act. 1972 provided the basis for pre-venting the tenant's eviction or in other words, the said provision afforded relief against liability for eviction subject to the condition that the tenant paid 'the entire' amount of rent due. Thus, it was held that Section 20 (4) of the said Act conferred an equitable benefit on the tenant to avoid eviction decree by complying with the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act. In other words, in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case (supra), the equitable principles of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act were applied in interpreting Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act. 1972.

11. But the scheme of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is somewhat different. Unlike Section 14 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. Sub-sections (1), (2), (2A) and (3) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act apply to all suits and proceedings instituted by the landlord for eviction of his tenant on any of the grounds referred to in Section 13 of the 1956 Act. After institution of a suit or proceeding, a tenant who does not raise any dispute is required to make payment or deposit of arrear rent with interest as prescribed and also current rent so long as an ejectment suit remains pending in the trial Court. When a tenant raises a dispute regarding 'amount of rent payable', the trial Court under Section 17 (2) of the 1956 Act shall determine the same. A defendant tenant under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2-A)of Section 17 may pray for extension of time to deposit the amount specified in Sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 17. He may also under Clause (b) of Section 17 (2-A) pray for granting instalments to pay the amounts specified in subsection 17 (1) of the Act. The time limit for making the prayer for such extension or for granting instalments has been specified in Section 17 (2-B) of the Act.

12. The effect of a failure on the part of a tenant to pay or deposit the amount as specified in the above Sub-sections of Section 17 as the case may be, has been provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act : the Court shall order his defence against delivery of possession to be struck off and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. But it is now well-settled that even in case the defence of a defendant tenant is struck out, a decree for eviction does not automatically follow. The trial Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment against a tenant protected under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act except on the landlord establishing any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 13 (1) of the Act. In this connection, reference may be made to the recent Full Bench decision of this Court in Gurudas Biswas v. Charu Panna Seal, : AIR1977Cal110 which approved the decision of P. N. Mookerjee and D. Basu, JJ. in Subodh Ch. Singha v. Santosh Kr. Srimani, (1964) 68 Cal WN 184 and held, inter alia, that whether an ejectment suit which is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is defended or not the Court must be satisfied that it has been established on evidence that the grounds alleged in the plaint take away the tenant's special protection conferred by Section 13 (1) of the Act.

13. There is another aspect of the matter. Only in case of a suit for ejectment on the ground of default under Section 13 (1) (i), if a tenant makes the deposit or payment as required by Sub-sections (1), (2) or (2-A) of Section 17 he can get the benefit of protection against eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. Such right to obtain benefit of protection against eviction on the ground of default is subject to the proviso to Section 17 (4) of the Act. In case an ejectment suit is filed on any other ground referred to in Section 13 (1) of the Act by complying with the requirements of the aforesaid Sub-sections of Section 17, a tenant defendant does not become eligible for protection against eviction but he is granted only the right to contest the ejectment suit in the trial Court Even when a tenant defendanthas made deposits or payments as required by Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) as the case may be of Section 17, a decree or order for delivery of possession of the suit premises to the landlord may be made on any of the grounds referred in Section 13 (1) except on the ground of default in payment of rent. Thus, the aforesaid Sub-sections of Section 17 do not provide a basis for preventing a tenant's eviction except in an ejectment suit brought on the ground of default in payment of rent. Unlike Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972, Section 17 (1), (2) and (2-A) provides the foundation for the landlord's right to recover arrears and current rent during the pendency of the ejectment suit in the trial Court and for the discharge of the tenant's liability to pay arrear and current rent.

14. I am not unmindful of the position that in relation to a suit for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent, Section 17 (4) provides a relief against the liability for eviction and the said provision has some similarity with that of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972. But there are also material differences between the two provisions.

15. The view that Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act primarily provide modes for discharging a tenant's liability for payment of arrear and current rent during the pendency of an ejectment suit finds support from the observations of Bose, C. J. and D. N. Sinha, J. in Siddeshwar v. Prakash, : AIR1964Cal105 (SB). D. N. Sinha, J., at pages 54 and 56 (of Cal WN) : (at pp. 117, 118, 119 of AIR) summarised the legal position and observed that the receipt by the landlord of all the amounts paid or deposited under Section 17 (1) would not amount to waiver or create a fresh tenancy. If a tenant makes such payment or deposit in terms of Section 17 he can never be said to be in default in payment of rents for the period for which such payments or deposits have been made irrespective of the results of such suit or proceeding.

16. It may be also pointed out that there appears to be some difference of opinion in this Court regarding the character of payment or deposit under Section 17 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and the said question was left open by the Supreme Court in Kalu Ram v. Baidyanath, : [1965]3SCR34 . But it has been uniformly and consistently held that a tenant under Section 17 (1) and (2) of the Act is requiredto deposit only those amounts which are recoverable as rent. I may refer to the decision of Banerjee, J. in Nasiban v. Parul Bala, (1958) 62 Cal WN 778, holding that the payment or deposit under Section 17 (1) of the Act would be in respect of all arrears of rent legally recoverable in payment of which the tenant may have made default. A Division Bench in Daya v. Cbapala, : AIR1960Cal378 similarly held that when the landlord transfers his interest, the tenant under Section 17 (1) is not required to deposit or pay the arrears which had become due to the ex-landlord even if the claim for the said unpaid amount had been assigned to the transferee landlord.

17. Bachawat and Chatterjee, JJ. in Raghunath Singh's case (1961-65 Cal WN 1093) (supra), applied the principles as laid down in the decision in Daya v. Chapala (supra), and held that time-barred amounts of rent were not required to be paid or deposited under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Their Lordships were fully cognizant of the fact that the expression 'legally recoverable' which appeared in Section 14 (1) of 1950 Act had not been retained in Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of 1956 Act. But Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the time-barred amounts were not liable to be deposited or paid under Section 17 (1) and (2) of the Act. The Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (supra) considered the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 17 which, inter alia, provided 'if ...... there is any dispute aslo the amount of rent payable by the tenant', and therefore, with respect, it would not be fair to observe that the Division Bench had introduced on their own construction any restrictive clause. The Court under Sub-section (2) has been given a statutory duty to determine disputes as to 'the amount of rent payable'. The Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (supra), had referred to a large number of authorities including the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidator, Dehradun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co., (1933) 60 Ind App 13 : (AIR 1933 PC 63). The Supreme Court also in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, : AIR1976SC1637 , held that in Section 7 (1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act the expression 'arrears of rent payable' means that what should be paid. If recovery of any amount is barred by limitation, the Estate Officer could not insist that such amountwas still payable. In fact, Satish Chandra, J. of Allahabad High Court in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust's case : AIR1977All399 (supra), had distinguished the said two decisions on the ground that Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings etc. Act, 1972 conferred upon the tenant a right to relief against eviction on condition that the rent due must be paid. The Supreme Court had approved the said view that on equitable considerations a tenant under Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act of 1972 was bound to deposit the entire rent due from him. My attention has been drawn to several decisions of other High Courts which have laid down that under other respective tenancy legislations considered therein the tenants were not required to deposit time-barred rents; I need not discuss these decisions because Bachawat, J. in Raghunath Singh's case (supra) rightly observed :

'But the question in each case is whether the particular statute requires the debtor lo pay the time-barred debt.'

18. I have already observed that Section 17 (1), (2) and (2A) does not provide any equitable relief. It is, also well settled so far as this Court is concerned that even in case of a suit for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent. Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable because such a suit cannot be considered as one on the ground of forfeiture on account of non-payment of rent. Section 17 (1) imposes a statutory obligation. When a tenant complies with the Sub-sections (1), (2) or (2A) of Section 17 of the 1956 Act, a tenant cannot be considered to be a defaulter within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (i) and the Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent except in a case covered by the proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. It may be pointed out that the Division Bench in Raghunath Singh's case (1961-65 Cal WN 1093) (supra), had pointed out the distinction between the provisions of Section 17 (1) and (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and those of Section 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (since repealed) which required the thika tenant to pay the arrear of rent due to the landlord as the condition precedent for stay of ejectment. Thus, the said Section 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act provided an equitable relief and therefore, the section contemplated the deposit of all arrears including time-barred amounts of rent.

19. Thus, it has been the consistent view of this Court that Sub-sections (1), (2) ofSection 17 have imposed a statutory obligation upon a tenant to deposit or pay arrear and current rent during the pendency of the ejectment suit in the trial Court otherwise his defence against delivery of possession is liable to be struck out. The said provisions also enable the landlord to receive rent from tenant without waiving his right to proceed with the ejectment suit against such tenant. I have already observed that the said Sub-sections (1) and (2) do not confer benefit of protection against eviction except in case of ejectment under Section 13 (1) (i) of 1956 Act. So far as this High Court is concerned, it is now stare decisis that both under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a tenant is under a statutory obligation to pay or deposit only the sums which are legally recoverable as rent.

20. Accordingly, the application under Section 17 (2A) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act filed by the defendant-tenant ought to be heard on merits. Mr. Mitra. learned Advocate for the landlord-opposite party has submitted that the disposal of the ejectment suit brought by his client on the grounds of reasonable requirement and default has been already considerably delayed and therefore, instead of remitting the matter back this Court may finally dispose of the defendant-tenant's application for the instalments. Questions regarding circumstances of the parties have not been raised before me. I, accordingly, make this Rule absolute in part, set aside the order complained of. The defendant-tenant's prayer under Section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is rejected. I allow the defendant-tenant's prayer under Section 17 (2A) (b) of the Act in the following manner :

21. Within one month from the date of the arrival of the record in the trial Court, the Court below will calculate the amount in terms of the proviso to Section 17 (2A) (b) and direct the defendant-tenant to pay or deposit by suitable instalments the said amount within six months from the said order of the trial Court. The trial Court will expeditiously dispose of the suit in accordance with law.

22. There will be no order as to costs.

23. Let a copy of this order and the records be sent down as early as possible.


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