Anil Kumar Sen, J.
1. The petitioner in this writ petition, Chinmoy Das appeared at the B.Sc. (Part 1) Examination of the Calcutta University held in May, 1968. He was appearing with Honours in Geology. Shri Souren Sen. Head of the Department of Geology, University of Calcutta, was appointed Examiner in respect of the Geology Honours First Paper. The said Shri Sen while examining the Geology Honours First Paper of different candidates apprehended that the petitioner having Roll No. Cal H 1021 had answered three questions and a part of the fourth in consultation with another candidate Baidyanath Raha bearing Roll No. Cal H 1022. He was further of the opinion that in respect of the three questions and a part of the fourth the aforesaid two candidates had copied from each other. Accordingly Shri Sen submitted a report on July 1, 1968.
2. On the basis of this report the result of the petitioner as also that of Baidyanath Raha was withheld being 'reported against' and the matter was referred to the Board of Discipline constituted by the University.
3. On November 25, 1968 the Secretary of the Board of Discipline Shri A.C. Banerjee issued a show cause memo on the petitioner asking him to show cause and appear before the sub-committee of the Board of Discipline which would investigate into the matter on November 30, 1968. The charge levelled against the petitioner was 'that you mutually copied answers from each other's answer script (Boll Cal H 1021 & Roll Cal H 1022) while appearing in Geology Honours'. The sub-committee of the Board of Discipline consisted of (1) Principal K.C. Choudhury, (2) Principal Meera Duttagupta and (3) Professor P. C. Bhattacharjee.
4. The petitioner appeared before the Sub-Committee on November 30, 1968. Although there is some dispute between the parties as to the manner in which the proceeding was conducted by the Sub-Committee it is not disputed that the petitioner denied the charges.
5. On December 7, 1968 the Sub-Committee submitted a report recommending cancellation of petitioner's examination for the year 1968. At the same time the Sub-Committee exonerated Baidyanath Kaha (Roll Cal H 1022) of the charges. On December 10. 1968 Secretary Shri A. C. Banerjee issued a memo intimating an order purported to be that of the Vice-Chancellor cancelling the B.Sc. Part I Examination of the petitioner for the year 1968. It is the validity of this order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this writ petition.
6. According to the petitioner he had a right of appeal against the order imposing a penalty on him to the Vice-Chancellor which, however, has been frustrated because the Vice-Chancellor himself had passed the order instead of the Syndicate. He made a representation to the University Authorities and then moved the aforesaid writ petition in this Court on March 26, 1969 and obtained the above Rule. By virtue of an interim order the petitioner also appeared in the B.Sc. Part II examination of the Calcutta University for the year 1969 but the result thereof had been withheld under the orders of this Court pending decision in this Rule,
7. Appearing in support of this Rule Mr. Nani Coomar Chakraborty has raised several points which I shall have occasion to refer hereinafter while considering the claim of the petitioner on the merits of the present application. The respondents are appearing to contest this Rule. Originally two affidavits, one by the Registrar and the other by Shri P.C. Bhattacharjee, one of the members of the Sub-Committee of the Board of Discipline were filed. Subsequently two more affidavits, one by the Vice-Chancellor himself and the other by Shri A.C. Banerjee have been filed. The petitioner in his turn has filed affidavits in reply thereto,
8. A disciplinary proceeding like the present one as against the petitioner is to be dealt with on the recommendations of a Board of Discipline constituted under Rule 60 of the First Ordinance framed under Section 58 (2) of the Calcutta University Act, 1966 (West Bengal Act 2 of 1966) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). Rule 62 of the said Ordinance lays down the manner in which the matter is to be dealt with. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the decision is to be taken by the Board of Discipline at a meeting and it was therefore necessary that the Board itself should have heard the petitioner before any final decision was taken; but that has not been done in the present case. Reliance is placed by Mr. Chakraborty on the decision of B. C. Mitra, J., D/- 9-7-1969 in Civil Rule No. 233 (W) of 1969 (Cal), (Ashok Kumar Sen Gupta v. University of Calcutta). By the said judgment B, C. Mitra, J. set aside similar decisions in respect of the B.Sc. Part II Examination of the University of Calcutta for the year 1968. This contention of Mr. Chakraborty would have been well founded on the provisions of Rule 62 as it stood prior to its amendment by the Syndicate on November 8. 1968. Under Rule 62 (5) previously all matters had to be decided by the Board of Discipline at a meeting. But after the amendment dated 8-11-68 it is the decision of the Sub-Committee which becomes effective subject to the confirmation by the Board of Discipline whose decision in its turn will be subject to confirmation by the Syndicate. Under the scheme of Rule 62 after the aforesaid amendment the delinquent candidate is to be informed of the charges and is to be asked to appear either before the Board or before the Sub-Committee; the Board or the Sub-Committee as the case may be shall enquire into the matter and if it holds the charges to have been proved it shall recommend the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Mr. Dey appearing on behalf of the respondents has contended that as the amendment came into effect on November 8. 1968 that is prior to the initiation of the disputed disciplinary proceedings it is to be governed by the provision of Rule 62 as amended and as such it has been rightly disposed of by the Sub-Committee there being no necessity for the Board of Discipline Itself to hear the same. According to Mr. Dey the decision of B. C. Mitra, J. Is not based on the Rules as amended but is one based on the earlier Rules.
9. Mr. Chakraborty, however, for more reasons than one has contended that the amendment dated November 8. 1968 can have no application. In the first place. Mr. Chakraborty has contended, that this amendment could have no effect prior to January 2, 1969 when for the first time the amendment was published in the official gazette. Secondly, Mr. Chakraborty has contended that the Syndicate had no authority in law to amend the First Ordinance framed by the First Vice-Chancellor under Section 58 (2) of the said Act. I shall consider both these objections raised by Mr. Chakraborty.
10. Under Section 23 (1) (i) read with Section 52 of the said Act the Syndicate is to make ordinances except of course the First Ordinance framed under Section 58 (2) thereof. Section 52 (2) provides that an Ordinance made by the Syndicate is to come into force from such date as the Syndicate may determine. Now in the present case the resolution of the Syndicate adopting the amendment to the First Ordinance itself provides that the amendment is to take immediate effect and is not to await the date of its publication. But Mr. Chakraborty relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, : AIR1963SC395 to contend that the amendment can have no effect from any date prior to its publication in the official gazette. In my view, however, the said decision cannot be an authority for the proposition contended for by Mr. Chakraborty. In that case the Supreme Court only held that an administrative decision does not become final unless it is communicated as prior thereto it remains provisional and open to alteration, These principles, by their very nature, can have no bearing on the question as to when a statutory rule or regulation comes into effect. In such cases, the statute itself should prevail and if the statute provides the manner or the time for the application of the rules or regulations made thereunder, they should be brought into effect exactly in the manner provided unless of course the said provision is void or ultra vires. To hold it otherwise is to override the statute. In the case of Harla v. State of Rajasthan, : 1SCR110 the Supreme Court no doubt held that it would be against the principles of natural justice to punish or penalise the subject under bye-laws of which they could or even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge in the absence of their publication. But even then the Supreme Court made a specific reservation by subjecting the principles to an exception 'in the absence of any special law or custom'. So that if the law itself provides otherwise the effect of a statutory rule or regulation need not await its formal publication. A Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court went further in holding that rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution need not wait till its publication for having its effect in the case of Mulchand v. Union of India, : AIR1970Guj257 . Furthermore, it is not known as to whether these amending provisions were otherwise promulgated or published or not. Mr. Chakraborty has built up his argument in this respect only on the basis that when the amendment was published in the official gazette on January 2, 1969 it can have no prior effect. On considerations as aforesaid I must overrule this part of Mr. Chakraborty's contention and I hold that the amending provisions did come into effect on November 8, 1968.
11. The second part of Mr. Chakraborty's objection is that the amendment itself is ultra vires the powers of the Syndicate. Reference is made to Section 58 (2) and (5) of the said Act and it is contended that when the First Ordinance was framed by the First Vice-Chancellor and when such Ordinance is to remain in effect until new ordinances are made under the provisions of the Act, the first ordinance can be replaced by a new ordinance framed by the Syndicate but it cannot be amended; the Syndicate though authorised to make a new ordinance is not authorised to amend the, First Ordinance itself. Looking at the substance I am, however, unable to find any merit in this contention of Mr. Chakraborty. If the Syndicate has authority to make a new ordinance superseding the First Ordinance itself why should it have no authority to amend the First Ordinance: to amend is to adopt the existing set of rules subject to the alterations made. When it is conceded that the Syndicate has due authority to frame a new Ordinance incorporating therein the provisions of the existing first Ordinance subject to the intended amendments, I am of the view that by the impugned amendment the Syndicate has done precisely the same thing and it cannot be said to have acted beyond its powers. That apart, in my view, there is substance in the contention of Mr. Dey that under the provisions of Section 23 (1) (i) read with Section 52 the Syndicate is authorised to amend an ordinance which because of the definition clause includes the first ordinance. In this view this part of Mr. Chakraborty's contention must also be overruled.
12. Mr. Chakraborty has next contended that the Vice-Chancellor could not have passed the penalty order of cancellation of the examination. Such order should have been passed by the Syndicate. And in any event Mr. Chakraborty contends that when the Vice-Chancellor is the appellate authority he having acted as the disciplinary authority, has frustrated the petitioner's right of appeal. It is not disputed by Mr. Dey appearing for the University Authorities that under Section 23 of the said Act read with Rule 62 of the First Ordinance, Syndicate is the final authority in the matter of taking decision in disciplinary proceedings of the present nature. Reliance however is placed on Section 9 (6) of the said Act by Mr. Dey in contending that although Syndicate is normally the competent authority to take the final decision, the Vice-Chancellor is not wholly incompetent in law. According to Mr. Dey under Section 9 (6) the Vice-Chancellor can also exercise the powers to be normally exercised by the Syndicate subject to a reference being made to the Syndicate, in paragraphs 17 and 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Registrar on August 4, 1969 it is claimed that the final order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of his emergency powers as at the relevant date the Syndicate itself was not constituted. The matter, however, having been referred to the Syndicate, was subsequently approved by the said authority on December 27, 19G8, The grounds of emergency pleaded in these two paragraphs are obviously erroneous and self-contradictory because the Syndicate was constituted as early as on September 20, 1968. This error was sought to be rectified by an affidavit filed by Shri A.C. Banerjee on December 21, 1970. in paragraph 3 of this affidavit it has been stated that the reason for the emergency, as set out in paragraphs 17 and 23 of the affidavit of the Registrar is erroneous, the error being the result of an oversight; in this affidavit it has further been pleaded that reason for the emergency is in the fact that the subject-matter is an examination which requires prompt action. A similar stand is taken by the Vice-Chancellor himself in paragraph 4 of his affidavit sworn on December 21, 1970. On the provisions of the statute I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that it was wholly beyond the powers of the Vice-Chancellor to take any decision in such a matter and as such the impugned order should be struck down as an ultra vires act on his part. But nonetheless I cannot but observe that when the matter had been left by the statute or the statutory regulation to the collective decision of all the members of the Syndicate Itself of which the Vice-Chancellor is one, it is normally desirable that unless it is otherwise impossible or impracticable the Syndicate itself should take the decision. In the present case nothing has been disclosed by the respondents in their affidavit to show why it was not possible for the Syndicate to take the decision. Even the reasons pleaded are found to be lacking in seriousness and the reasons originally pleaded has subsequently been admitted to be erroneous. I am unable to appreciate how, unless the authorities were really supplementing grounds to justify their original action, such error could come in. It should be noted that in the order itself nothing has been recited to indicate that the impugned order was being passed by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of his emergency powers. Even in the affidavits filed on December 21, 1970 the reason pleaded is that the matter being concerned with examination prompt action was required. When the statute or the statutory regulation entrusted such a matter to the Syndicate it was known to the law makers that the matter would concern an examination which would require a prompt action, but nonetheless it was entrusted to the Syndicate and not to the Vice-Chancellor alone. I may agree with Mr. Dey that there may on the facts or circumstances of a particular case arise an occasion for taking such a decision by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of his emergency powers but that must always be the exception and not the rule. However when the Syndicate itself had subsequently approved the decision on December 27. 1968 and when on my finding there was no lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Vice-Chancellor to make such an order I would not set aside the impugned decision as one taken without jurisdiction.
13. The other relative objection of Mr. Chakraborty is based on Section 9 (4) of the said Act. It is claimed by Mr. Chakraborty that under Section 9 (4) an appeal lay to the Vice-Chancellor against the decision of the Syndicate but the Vice-Chancellor himself having acted as a disciplinary authority he has frustrated the appeal. Section 9 (4) of the said Act by itself does not provide that an appeal should lie to the Vice-Chancellor against the decision taken by the Board of Discipline or the Syndicate under Rule 62 of the First Ordinance. The said section only provides that the Vice-Chancollor shall decide and dispose of all appeals in disciplinary matters not provided for in Section. 35. In my view, this provision cannot be interpreted to include any disciplinary action taken by the Syndicate in such matters as in the present case because under Section 22 the Syndicate consists of the Vice-Chancellor and the other members specified therein. Therefore when the original decision is taken by the Vice-Chancellor himself along with other members it was never intended by the legislature that the Vice-Chancellor sitting alone would set aside the decision of the Syndicate. In my view the disciplinary matters referred to in Section 9 (4) cannot be interpreted to Include any disciplinary action which is to be taken under the statute or the statutory rules by the Syndicate. Furthermore whether the order is passed by the Vice-Chancellor or the Syndicate the Vice-Chancellor would be a party to the decision in either event, so this objection of Mr. Chakraborty cannot be said to be the creation of Vice-Chancellor by exercise of his emergency powers. In this view the second objection taken by Mr. Chakraborty must fail and is overruled.
(In Paragraph 14 the order rejects as baseless petitioner's contention that the Vice-Chancellor had imposed the penalty without due application of his mind. In Para. 15 it rejects the contention that petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity. It then proceeds:)
16. The last point raised by Mr. Chakraborty raises a fundamental question as to whether the disciplinary authority namely the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline could recommend a penalty without recording any formal finding on the charges levelled against the petitioner or assigning any reason and whether the University Authorities could impose a penalty on such a recommendation. According to Mr. Chakraborty, although the petitioner was charged with a gross misconduct of mutually copying from each other's answer script along with another candidate namely Baidyanath Raha there is nothing on record except the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the petitioner's examination be cancelled and that the other candidate be exonerated from the charge; there is no finding even recorded against the petitioner that he is guilty of the charges framed against him far less any reason as to why the petitioner should be penalised while the other is to be exonerated, Mr. Chakraborty contends that the Sub-Committee and the Board of Discipline exercises judicial powers in such matters and before any penalty could be imposed or recommended it was necessary for the said authorities to make a judicial determination of the charges. According to Mr. Chakraborty, judicial determination required the said authorities not only to arrive at a specific finding on the charges but also to assign reasons therefor. In the absence of either the decision and the penalty on the basis thereof cannot be supported. Mr. Dey appearing on behalf of the respondents could not controvert the position that the report of the Sub-Committee does not contain any express finding or reason therefor. He has drawn my attention to the provisions of Rule 62 (4) which provides that if the Board or the Sub-Committee holds the charges to have been proved it may recommend cancellation of the examination or any other penalty as it may deem fit. Relying on this provision Mr. Dey contends that when the Sub-Committee recommended cancellation of the petitioner's examination It must be presumed that the Sub-Committee holds the charges against the petitioner to have been proved. Secondly Mr. Dev has contended that neither the statute nor the statutory regulation requires any reason to be recorded and as such absence of reasons would not vitiate the order.
17. It is now well settled that the authorities like the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline discharges quasi-judicial functions in making its recommendations on determination of allegations of breach of discipline and as such it had an obligation to act judicially. Reference may be made to the cases of Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam, : AIR1962SC1110 and Board of High School and Intermediate Education. U. P. v. Chittra, : 3SCR266 . As a matter of fact the Supreme Court approved the earlier decisions of this Court in the case of Dipa Pal v. Calcutta University, : AIR1952Cal594 and B. C. Das Gupta v. B. Rakshit, : AIR1953Cal212 . This being the position the obligation to record reason is not dependent solely on the provisions of the statute or the statutory rules: it may also arise from the nature of the function itself Mr. Dey may be right that there is no express provision either in the statute or in the statutory regulation requiring the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline to assign any reason. It is, however, necessary to consider the scheme provided by Regulation 62 of the First Ordinance, Rule 62 (2) requires that all cases of breaches of discipline in connection with the University Examinations shall forthwith be reported with relevant documents and details to the Secretary of the Board of Discipline. Rule 62 (3) provides that on receipt of such reports the Secretary of the Board shall inform the student concerned of the charges against him and ask him to appear before the Board or the Sub-Committee and furnish an explanation verbally and in writing with regard to the charge. Rule 62 (4) provides if the Board or the Sub-Committee holds that the charges have been proved it may recommend cancellation of the examination or such other penalty as specified therein as it may deem fit. Rule 62 (5) provides that the decision of the sub-committee shall be subject to the confirmation by the Board of Discipline and that the proceedings of the Board shall be placed before the Syndicate for confirmation. Under Rule 62 (6) the decision of the Board of Discipline is made subject to confirmation by the Syndicate. On these provisions I am clearly of the view that either the Board or the Sub-Committee to whichever authority the determination is assigned must have to find that the charge of breach of discipline had been proved against the delinquent candidate. Such determination must be made with reference to the relevant documents, details and reports as also the explanation furnished by the candidate referred to in sub-rules (2) & (3) of Rule 62 of the First Ordinance. Furthermore if such determination is made by the Sub-Committee it is subject to review both by the Board of Discipline as also by the Syndicate for the purpose of approval and if the determination is by the Board itself then the review is by the Syndicate for the purpose of such approval. Rule 61 (2) of the First Ordinance similarly requires that the Secretary of the Board shall keep records of the proceedings of the meeting of the Board. The scheme of these provisions clearly implies that the Sub-Committee or the Board should record its findings on the charges and the reasons therefor as otherwise its review by the Syndicate or the Board of Discipline as the case may be for the purpose of approval becomes a useless formality. In my view if what is recorded is mere recommendation of the penalty and nothing else it is not known how either the Board of Discipline or the Syndicate would discharge its obligation of approving or confirming the same. Approval or the confirmation in my view means appraisement of the findings of the Board or the Sub-Committee as also the penalty recommended with reference thereto. On the other hand if the approval or the confirmation is to be made only with reference to the recommendation of the penalty itself and nothing else not only (will there be no scope for approval or confirmation but such approval or confirmation would be nothing else than an inconsequential formality. For these reasons I must hold that under the provisions of these rules of the First Ordinance it was necessary on the part of the Board or the Sub-Committee to record its findings along with the reasons therefor on the charges levelled against the delinquent candidate before it could recommend any penalty. Rule 62 (4) of the First Ordinance if it does not expressly lay down such a thing at least lays it down by necessary implication.
18. That apart it has again been laid down by the Supreme Court that when a Tribunal exercises quasi-judicial or judicial function it is required to pass 'speaking' order. Giving reasons for determination is one of the fundamental and elementary requirements of judicial or quasi-judicial process. It ensures that decisions in such cases are not the result of whim or fancy but of a judicial approach to the issues; it also ensures adjudication according to law and procedure established by law and the parties to be affected by the determination is thereby made to know the grounds on which the tribunal has decided against him. This is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, : 3SCR302 which reviewed all the earlier decisions and reaffirmed the principle earlier laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Govind Rao v. State of M. P., : 1SCR678 and Harinagar Sugar Mills v. S. S. Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1969. In a still later decision Involving determination by the High Court itself the Supreme Court again expressed the same view in the case of Swarnalata v. Harendra, : 3SCR976 . It is however necessary that reference should be made to two other decisions of the Supreme Court taking a somewhat different view but in circumstances wholly distinguishable in the cases of Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 0044/1965 : 1SCR466 and Som Datt Dutta v. Union of India : 1969CriLJ663 . In both these cases when the Central Government was confirming orders of subordinate authorities, the Supreme Court overruled the objection that if such confirmation is not accompanied by reasons the same is liable to be set aside. In the case of Govind Rao, : 1SCR678 the learned Chief Justice recorded his dissent and held that even in such cases it is obligatory for the Central Government to record its reasons. But in these two decisions the Supreme Court was not really considering an issue like the present one and the Supreme Court itself had distinguished this view taken in the case of 0044/1965 : 1SCR466 in the later decision of : 3SCR302 . It is necessary to refer to a still later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Prasad v. State of U. P.. : 1SCR201 . In the last mentioned case the Supreme Court was considering the question whether in a quasi-judicial determination the quasi-judicial authority is required to give reasons in support of its decision or not and it was held that recording of such reasons is obligatory. On the authority of these decisions of the Supreme Court I must negative the contention of Mr. Dey that the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline was not required to record its reasons or findings in support of its recommendations. Mr. Dey has referred to and relied on some decisions of the Supreme Court where it has been held that if the finding of the Tribunal is otherwise supportable by the evidence this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction as a court of appeal. But in my view those decisions are not really relevant to the point at issue.
19. Judging from the aforesaid point of view I cannot but accept the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that the recommendations of the Sub-Committee and the Board of Discipline in the present case cannot be held to be in accordance with law nor can the final order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on the basis thereof be upheld. In the present case, two candidates were charged of a breach of discipline in mutually copying from each other, one is exonerated by the Sub-Committee while in respect of the other the recommendation is that his examination be cancelled. It is not known what is really the basis for such a recommendation. The Sub-Committee has not opened its mind nor the authorities that followed. Mr. Chakraborty is right in his contention that it is not even known whether for a breach of discipline as incorporated in the charge or for any other misdemeanour the Sub-Committee recommended cancellation of petitioner's examination. One is left to speculate as suggested by Mr. Dey that the Sub-Committee must have found the charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved when they recommended the penalty of the cancellation of the examination. I am however of the view that it is not possible' to uphold a penalty like the present one merely on speculation. I had called upon the counsel for University Authorities to produce any record or minute of the Sub-Committee or of the Board of Discipline to indicate what was actually found as against the petitioner or what were the reasons that prevailed upon the Sub-Committee or the Board to exonerate one and penalise the other but the learned counsel has frankly admitted that there is no record except the report disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition of the Registrar at page 28 (annexure E thereto). This report disclosed a very sad state of affairs. It indicates that the very same Sub-Committee was considering cases of breaches of discipline against numerous candidates. It had held seven sittings between November 30, 1968 to December 7, 1968. There is no indication how the individual cases were considered and/or dealt with by the Sub-Committee. The report proceeds to record that the Sub-Committee interrogated the delinquent candidates who in reply made statements both verbal and written. Then it goes on to record that after full consideration of all facts and careful perusal of all relevant papers connected with the cases the Sub-Committee made its recommendations under three heads.
20. Under the first are the roll numbers of the candidates who have been exonerated of the charges; under the second are the roll numbers of the candidates against whom cancellation has been recommended; and under the third are the roll numbers of candidates against whom the recommendation is cancellation of the examination together with an order debarring them from appearing in the examination to be held in the year 1969, Unfortunately even in respect of the second and third category where the penalty has been recommended the Sub-Committee even failed to record any finding if and to what extent the different candidates have been found to be guilty of the charges levelled against them far less recording any reasons for such findings. In my view this is not the determination envisaged by the regulation for the purpose of imposing a penalty on a candidate which is of great consequence so far as the candidate is concerned. It leaves an impression that the Sub-Committee was acting mechanically and not in the true spirit of determining the truth or otherwise of the allegation on the basis whereof a penalty is being imposed on a number of candidates. This is the position so far as the recommendation of the Sub-Committee is concerned. The approval by the Board of Discipline or the Syndicate or the order of the Vice-Chancellor himself makes no improvement over the matter. All of them merely record a formal order of approving the recommendation of the Sub-Committee. In such circumstances I am unable to uphold the legality of the determination by the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline in the present case as also the final order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on the basis thereof or the approval thereof by the Syndicate.
21. The Rule accordingly succeeds and is made absolute. The decision and the recommendation of the Sub-Committee dated December 7, 1968 so far as it relates to the present petitioner is set aside so also the order of the Vice-Chancellor communicated by the memo dated December 10, 1968. The approval accorded by the Board of Discipline as also the Syndicate in so far as they relate to the recommendations as against the petitioner are also set aside. The respondents however will be entitled to re-adjudicate the charges levelled against the petitioner in accordance with law and in the light of the decision rendered herein and they would further be at liberty to pass any final order or impose any penalty in consonance with the determination to be made after re-adjudication in accordance with law. Let a writ of certiprari do issue quashing the recommendation of the Sub-Committee, the approval of the Board of the Discipline and the Syndicate so far as they relate to the petitioner as referred to hereinbefore as also the order of the Vice-Chancellor imposing the penalty of cancellation of examination on the petitioner as communicated by the memo dated December 10, 1968 subject to liberty given to the respondents as indicated hereinbefore. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus also do issue commanding the respondents not to give effect to the aforesaid recommendation of the Sub-Committee dated December 7, 1968 and the order of penalty imposed by the Vice-Chancellor as communicated by the memo dated December 10. 1968 but subject to the liberty given to the respondents as indicated hereinbefore. There will be no order for costs in this Rule.