1. This rule has been issued on the ground that the petitioner not having been a party to any proceeding before the Magistrate who made the complaint against him under Section 476, Criminal P.C., the case instituted against him on such complaint should be withdrawn. The fact is that the petitioner was the Sub-Inspector of Gangajalbati Police Station in the District of Bankura. One Jugal Kishore Singh, a constable, lodged a first information report with the petitioner against certain persons charging one of them with escaping from his lawful custody and the others for rescuing him. This information was enquired into by a superior officer to the petitioner who found it to be false and concocted with the help of the petitioner and others. Mr. Bell, Superintendent of Police, Bankura, then lodged a complaint in Court under Section 211, I.P.C., against all the parsons concerned including the petitioner, Jugal Kishore riled a protest petition and the the case was enquired into and ultimately dismissed as false by the Deputy Magistrate, Mr. D.K. Ghose. Mr. Ghose on dismissing Jugal Kishore's complaint asked the petitioner and other persons to show cause why they should not be prosecuted under certain sections of the Indian Penal Code.
2. On considering the cause shown the learned Deputy Magistrate made a complaint against them under Section 476, Criminal P.C., for offences under Sections 120-B-211, 193, 466, 466-109. There was an appeal by the petitioner to the Sessions Judge of Bankura against the order made by the Deputy Magistrate under Section 476-B. The learned Judge in a careful and lucid judgment dismissed the appeal but made certain slight alterations in the order m de by the Deputy Magistrate. The petitioner moved this Court and obtained this rule on the ground that he was not a party to the proceeding before Mr. D.R. Ghose and that officer had no jurisdiction to make a complaint against him under Section 476. Before proceeding further it may be noted that the petitioner has raised an argument before us which is more academical than of any practical importance. If we set aside the complaint against the petitioner made by the Court under Section 476 the result - will be that Mr. Bell's complaint existing against the petitioner will proceed. But as the point has been raised and strenuously argued it is necessary to give our opinion on it. We have already held in giving our decision in Criminal Admitted Appeals Nos. 934 and 935 of 1929 decided on 5th May last that the Court may make a complain against a person under Section 476, for an offence under Section 211, I.P.C., if it is of opinion that the proceeding before the Court was caused to be started by that person though he was not a party to a proceeding before it. Here we may shortly give our reasons for that view. We have expressed therein, (1) under Section 211, I.P.C., a person who institutes, and also a person who causes to be instituted, a criminal proceeding which is proved to be false may be prosecuted for an offence under that section; and under Section 195, Criminal P.C., Clause (4), a person who abets the commission of an offence may also be prosecuted under that section; (2) Section 476 does not speak of a party to a proceeding. It says that the Court can order further enquiry in a criminal case in respect of any offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b)(c) which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court.
3. The words 'in' and 'in relation to' must be given their meaning; otherwise there is no sense in using those words. An offence may be committed by a person in relation to a judicial proceeding though he may not be a party to the proceeding or though it may not have been committed by that person in a judicial proceeding. (3) The offences with which the petitioner is charged are covered by Section 195(1)(b) which are not restricted to the party committing the offence in or in relation to a proceeding in Court which is similarly worded as Section 476. A different consideration may arise in respect of an offence mentioned in Clause (c), Section 195(1). We are fortified in this view of ours by a Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Emperor v. Syed Khan A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 321.
4. The distinction seems to be this: that if a false information is lodged to the police with the conspiracy of several persons then all of them may be prosecuted for lodging false information. If the person who lodges the information goes to the Court without the assistance or collusion of the abettors the Court may not have jurisdiction to order prosecution of the persons other than the man who actually gave the information. But where it is apparent that several persons combined to lodge a false information with the police and also lay a false complaint in Court the Court will have the power to pass orders-against all the persons under Section 476 who had thus conspired. The case law on this point is not very clear as will appear from the judgment in the case of Jadu Nandan Singh v. Emperor  37 Cal. 250 where all the cases have been noted; but it is to be noticed that the preponderance of judicial opinion is that in cases coming under Section 195(1)(b) the Court has authority to order the prosecution under Section 476 in respect of offences mentioned therein whether committed by a person to a proceeding or by a person not apparently connected with the proceeding. In Dharmadas Kawar v. Emperor  7 C.L.J. 373 sanction was-given for the prosecution of two persons on the allegation that they had instigated the complainant to lodge a false information. That order was set aside by this Court on the ground that the information was lodged only before the police and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to sanction the prosecution of those persons. The decision of the Court did not rest on the ground that the party against whom sanction was given was not a party to the proceeding. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the order passed by Mr. D.R. Ghosh, Deputy Magistrate directing the prosecution of the petitioner was passed with jurisdiction. This rule, therefore, will stand discharged.
5. As the proceedings have been so long, protracted as remarked by the Sessions-Judge we expect that action in the matter will be taken at once. Let the record be sent down at once.