1. The main ground which has been argued in this appeal is that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is wrong in law, inasmuch as it is based on materials which were not evidence and which have been improperly admitted. It is not necessary to go, with detail, into the various points on which the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner is attacked. It is sufficient to point out one or two instances which are the grounds for the order which I propose to make. It appears from the judgment itself that certain books which were described as text-books, namely, Robinson's Land Tenure Reports, Cotton's Memorandum of Land Tenures in Bengal and Webster's Report on the Land Tenure of Chota Nagpur, were referred to, and, (so far as 1 understand the judgment) relied on by the learned Judicial Commissioner. These books were referred to by him after the case was closed and the parties had no opportunity of dealing with the matters therein mentioned. Assuming (as to which 1 say nothing) that these reports would have been evidence; the Judicial Commissioner states that he delayed giving judgment in the case, as he had been endeavouring to obtain books of acknowledged authority in relation to the Land Tenures Which' were the subject of discussion in the judgment until he could obtain them from Calcutta. I may refer in this, connection to what was said in Vallabha v. Madusudanan .
2. Then in the judgment he refer(1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 495s to the Porahat settlement and to the Settlement Officer's report in connection with that settlement, though that settlement report was not in evidence or referred to by the parties.
3. Then, there are other matters which appear to have been relied upon, for which there is no evidence and in respect of which the learned Judicial Commissioner appears to have relied upon his own personal knowledge. It is stated, for instance' in the judgment, 'that in some cases it is believed that landlords have for some years been deliberately inducing ignorant tenants to sign documents describing themselves as temporary lessees, ticadars or ijaradars, with the object of evicting them from their hereditary tenancies when it is thought advisable.' There appears to be no evidence in support of this statement. There are other passages upon which reliance has been placed in this connection.
4. I am of opinion, Therefore, that the decree of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and the case remanded to the Judicial Commissioner for a re-hearing in accordance with law and upon such evidence as the law allows.
5. The costs will abide the result of the hearing of the appeal on remand.
5. I agree.