1. No. 299. In this case what happened is this: The opposite party No. 1 was tried before the Additional Sessions Judge of Tippera and a jury under Section 302, I.P.C. for having murdered his wife. The case for the defence was that the opposite party No. 1 at the time he committed the act in question was of unsound mind and therefore incapable of knowing what he was doing or that it was wrong or illegal. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty. In answer to a question put by the learned Sessions Judge to the jury, the foreman stated that the jury were of opinion that the opposite party No. 1 had killed his wife but that he was insane and incapable of knowing what he was doing. The learned Judge agreeing with the verdict of the jury acquitted the accused by his order dated 11th January 1928. He was of opinion that at the date of the aforesaid order, that is, 11th January 1928, the opposite party No. 1 was same and he accordingly directed that he should be kept in the safe custody of his relatives, upon their furnishing two security bonds of Rs. 2,500, each to keep the opposite party No. 1 in safe custody and to prevent him from doing injury to himself or to others and to produce him if and when required by the Court. It appears that thereafter the opposite party No. 2 who is the father and the opposite party No. 3 who is the brother of opposite Party No. 1 stood surety for the opposite party No. 1 in terms of the order of the learned Judge. This order of the learned Judge was apparently made under the provisions of Section 471, Criminal P.C.
2. The Local Government has through the Legal Remembrancer now moved this Court and the contention on behalf of the Legal Remembrancer is that having regard to the language used in Sections 466, 471 and 475, Criminal P.C., the order made by the learned Judge referred to above was clearly one which was without jurisdiction. It is contended that all that he could do under Section 471 was to detain the accused in safe custody and to report the matter to the Local Government and that under Section 475 it is the Local Government who can, if so satisfied, deliver the accused to any relative or friend of his for safe custody.
3. In our opinion, this contention is well founded, and must be given effect to. 'Detained in safe custody' in Section 471 does not mean, having regard to the language used in Section 475, 'detained in the custody of friends or relatives.' That is quite clear. It would, therefore, follow that the learned Judge was in error in making the order in the form in which he did. That order must, therefore, be set aside and it must be left to the Local Government under Section 475 to pass suitable orders for the delivery of the accused to such relatives or friends of the accused as may apply to the Local Government in that behalf. (A similar order was passed in case No. 300.)