Stephen and Mullick, JJ.
1. In this case the Local Government acting under Section 8 of the Bengal and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, appointed Mr. James Additional District Judge at Patna. On the 2nd February, 1914, Mr. Roe, the District Judge, transferred to him a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure instituted before himself, which had proceeded as far as the settlement of issues. It is not disputed that this transfer was made under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. On Mr. James taking up the case, it was argued before him that he had no jurisdiction to deal with it, but this was overruled. A Rule, however, has been granted in this Court calling on the opposite party to show cause why the order transferring the case to the file of the Additional Judge should not be set aside as being made without jurisdiction. The objection to Mr. Roe's order is as follows: The effect of Mr. James' appointment was that he became capable of discharging any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge might assign to him, and of exercising the powers of a District Judge in discharging them; but the functions so assigned must be general and no such functions were assigned by Mr. Roe's order of transfer under Section 24 of the Code. This is a sound objection, and a comparison of the language of the two enactments referred to, makes any other conclusion impossible. It is also consistent with the decision of this Court in Abdul Karim Abu Ahmed Khan v. Abdus Sobhan Chowdhry (1911) I.L.R. 39 Calc. 146. Had the Local Government empowered Mr. James to receive suits under Section 92, the case might have been different, for it is not disputed that he would then have been 'the Principal Civil Court' under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, though he would be a Subordinate Court under Section 24. Had the District Judge assigned to Mr. James the function of a District Judge in respect of Section 92, then also all mighty have been well. Bat, as it is, Mr. James had no jurisdiction to deal with cases under Section 92 at the time the order was made, and Mr. Roe effected nothing by his order of transfer.
2. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute and the order of transfer is set aside. We make no order as to costs.