1. The only question raised in this case is whether a regular suit would lie for setting aside an order such as is contemplated by the proviso to Section 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is, an order determining any question of title or priority as between the decree-holder and any other person in respect of money in deposit in a Court of Justice.
2. It is contended for the appellant that no such suit would lie, as there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which says that an order of this kind is liable to be questioned by a regular suit, and that the intention of Section 272 is to make-the Court, in whose custody the money or property in dispute is, the only Court competent to determine the question.
3. We do not think this contention is sound. Section 272 is one of a group of sections commencing with Section 272 and ending with Section 285; and all that the proviso to Section 272 intends, when declaring that the Court in which the property or money is deposited.shall be the Court that shall determine any question of title or priority, is to make that Court the tribunal for investigating claims, as distinguished from the Court which issues the attachment in execution of decree, which is the Court that in ordinary cases has to investigate and decide upon claims. But the mode of investigation, the nature of the order to be made, and the extent to which such an order is final are we think, provided for in Sections 278 to 283. There does not appear to us to be any reason why greater finality should be given to an order such as is contemplated in the proviso to Section 272 than is given to an order in any other claim case. The point taken before us therefore fails, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.