1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for defamation.
2. The lower Court has held that the person defamed was the plaintiff's wife and therefore the suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff, that there was no special damage suffered by tire plaintiff, and that for this reason, if the suit lay, the plaintiff could not recover damages.
3. The plaintiff appeals. His pleader's arguments are
(1) that there was special damage,
(2) that the words alleged to have been used by the defendant were defamatory in themselves, and
(3) that the plaintiff was himself defamed and that conse-quently the plaintiff was entitled to sue.
4. It is clear that the defendant is alleged to have used words, which not only defamed the plaintiff's wife, but the plaintiff. They imputed unchastity to the plaintiff's wife, and that the plaintiff not with standing this fact, cohabited with her and ate the food cooked by her and that he had lost his caste. The plaintiff could, therefore, maintain an action on his own account
5. As for the question of special damage, we must, I consider, accept the finding of fact arrived at by the Subordinate Judge, that the plaintiff suffered no special damage.
6. But it would appear to me that the words alleged to have been used by the defendant were defamatory in themselves, and did not amount to mere verbal abuse. Hence, the Full Bench decision in Girish Chandra Mitra v. Jatadhari Sadhukhan (1899) I.L.R. 26 Calc. 653 does not apply. The cause of action in this case arose in the mofussil and not in Calcutta; so that this case is not governed by the rule laid down in Bhooney Moni Dasi v. Natobar Biswas (1901) I.L.R. 28 Calc. 452.
7. It has been in many cases laid down that when words defamatory in themselves and not mere verbal abuse, have been used, a plaintiff is entitled to damages, though no special damage is proved to have been suffered; Ibiri Hasein v. Haidar (1885) I.L.R. 12 Calc. 109, Trai-lakya Nath Ghose v. Chandra Nath Dutt (1885) I.L.R. 12 Calc. 424, Jageswar Sarma v. Dinaram Sarma (1898) 3 C.L.J. 140 and Parvathi v. Manna (1884) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 175.
8. In the last mentioned of these cases it has apparently been laid down that an action will not lie for vulgar abuse or mere hasty expressions, but for malicious or culpable oral defamation an action will lie. It would seem to me that the Full Bench decision of this Court, already alluded to, in no way conflicts with this rule, which I consider it is desirable to adhere to.
9. I would, therefore, remand this case to the Lower Appellate Court for disposal.
10. I agree.