1. In this case the plaintiff sues the Official Trustee to have it declared that a deed of settlement executed on the 18th September 1880, is invalid and void; and that the plaintiff is entitled to require the Official Trustee to make over to him Rs. 6,000, which, under the deed, have been placed in the hands of the Official Trustee.
2. The deed provided that the Official Trustee should, subject to certain conditions, pay the interest of the Rs. 6,000 to plaintiff for life, and after plaintiff 's death, provided he should have lawful issue, the trust-fund should be for his widow or widows and lawful lineal descendants, as specified: and if there should be no lawful issue, then, after deducting the widow's share, for brothers, sisters and others.
3. There is a power of revocation with the consent of the Official Trustee.
4. The plaintiff married in August 1881; his wife is an infant. Her guardian remains neutral in the suit: the Official Trustee declines to give his assent except subject to the orders of the Court. The plaintiff alleges that the statement in the deed that he was at the date thereof in no way indebted was false.
5. The Official Trustee was, in my opinion, right, and exercised a wise discretion in refusing his assent to the revocation of this deed.
6. The plaintiff is now seeking to put the Court in motion on the grounds-1st, that a deed which he deliberately executed was void under his personal law; and 2nd, that one of its principal recitals was untrue.
7. If I considered, which I do not, that there is anything in 21 Geo. III., c. 70, Section 17, or any other law now in force, to warrant the assertion that a Mahomedan cannot legally create a trust such as the present, I should still regard the present plaintiff as precluded from urging that ground for setting aside his own act, nor of course can the plaintiff rely on the untruthfulness of his recital as a ground of relief against his own deed.
8. There may be cases in which, as in the case of Kanye Dass Byragee v. Ramgopal Ghose 16 S.D.A. 23 since no other person but the settlor is interested, the deed may be regarded as a mere direction as to the mode in which the settlor's property should be applied for his benefit, and as such revocable by the settlor. Any question of this sort is, however, removed in the present instance by the existence of an infant beneficiary, which brings the case clearly within the rule laid down in Bill v. Cureton 2 M. and K. 503 and the other authorities.
9. The suit must be dismissed with one set of costs for the Official Trustee. No costs for the guardians of the minor.