R.N. Dutt, J.
1. The petitioner is the tenant and the opposite party is the landlord of the disputed premises. The opposite party filed a suit for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of default. The petitioner filed written-state-ment. Subsequently the opposite party filed an application under Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the learned Judge allowed that application and struck out the petitioner's defence against delivery of possession. Thereafter, the suit was decreed ex parte on September 1, 1967. On September 22, 1967 the petitioner filed an application under Section 17-C of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act as incorporated by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967. The application was resisted by the opposite party and the learned Judge rejected the application. The petitioner has thereafter obtained this Rule.
2. Under Section 17-C as incorporated by the said Ordinance an application could be made in a proceeding where the decree for the recovery of possession was passed before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967. The application was made on September 22, 1967, that is, at a time when the Ordinance was still in force. The Ordinance came into effect on August 26, 1967. The right sought to be enforced by the petitioner by virtue of this application is a right conferred on him by Section 17-C as incorporated by the Ordinance. Section 17-C as it then stood] said that it would be attracted where the decree was passed before the commencement of the Ordinance. Here, as I have said, the Ordinance commenced to have effect from August 26. 1967, but the decree was passed on September 1, 1967, that is, after the commencement of the Ordinance. So Section 17-C as incorporated by the Ordinance on the basis of which the petitioner claimed the right is not attracted to the instant case. It is no doubt true that when the learned Judge considered this matter the Ordinance was replaced by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1968. Section 1 (2) of the Act specifically states that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 26th August, 1967. Mr. Mehata refers to the decisions of this Court in Benu Roy v. Manin-dra Nath Chatteriee. : AIR1969Cal67 and Md. Yusuf v. Golam Jilani, (1969) 73 Cal WN 736. Firstly, those cases are distinguishable. In those oases the question involved was the right of a tenant to make an application after the Amendment Act was published in March 1968. But in the instant case the application under Section 17-C which has become Section 17-B under the Amendment Act was made within sixty days of the commencement of the Ordinance for enforcement of the right conferred by the Ordinance. Secondly, with all respects I am unable to agree with the reasonings in those cases. The decisions in those cases proceeded on the footing that a right to make an application under Section 17-B has been conferred by the Amendment Act of 1968. But that does not appear to me to be really so. The right was in fact conferred on the tenant for the firsttime by the Ordinance of 1967 and that right was to be exercised within sixty days from the date the Ordinance came into force. Since the Ordinance remained valid only for six months, an Act was necessary to incorporate the rights conferred by the Ordinance as a permanent feature in the statute. No new right to make such an application was conferred by the Act of 1968 and so there was no question of any fresh application under Section 17-B which was formerly Section 17-C after the publication of the Amendment Act, 1968. I cannot therefore agree with the decisions in those two cases to the effect that to enable fresh applications to be filed the Amendment Act of 1968 should be held to have commenced on March 26, 1968. But since the instant case is distinguishable it is not necessary to refer the matter to a Division Bench. Here, as I have said, it is not a question of fresh application but the application was made when the Ordinance was still in force and the application was to enforce a right conferred by the Ordinance which specifically said that the decree must have been passed before the commencement of the Ordinance. Since in the instant case the decree was passed after that, Section 17-C which is now Section 17-B is not attracted.
3. The Rule is therefore discharged.
4. No order is made as to costs.