1. In this rule the Deputy Commissioner has been called on to show cause why the order passed under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, should not be set aside. The rule was issued on two grounds only. The first was, that the order is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as, according to the settlement papers, the land in dispute is a joint property in which the petitioners were co-sharers. It appears that the dispute between the parties is as to the possession of certain land on which there are sal trees, and this land is situated in a jote in which the parties are co-sharers. But the first party claims the sole possession of the land about which the dispute has taken place and it has been found by the Magistrate that he was in sole possession of this land. That being so, the Court has jurisdiction to make an order under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.
2. The second ground on which the rule was granted was, that the allegations of the first party do not show such a dispute as was likely to cause a breach of the peace and the proceeding, is therefore, without jurisdiction. It appears that the Magistrate in this case acted on a petition filed by the first party, and that the first party was not examined on oath nor was any police report called for. Our attention (has been drawn to the case of Sreeman Kumara Tirumalraja Bahadur Raja of Karvetnagar v. Sowkar Lodd Govind Dass Krishna Dass  29 Mad. 561. We agree with what is there said that where there is no Police report the statements of interested parties ought to be received with great caution. But we are unable to hold that, if the Magistrate has reason to believe such a statement, he acts, without jurisdiction in taking proceedings under this section. In the present case when this petition was filed by the first party the Magistrate had already some knowledge of the facts of the case from the previous proceedings between the parties with reference to the same dispute. That being so, we think he may have had good reason to believe the statement that a breach of the peace was probable, and we certainly cannot hold that he acted without jurisdiction in acting on such belief.
3. We, therefore, discharge this rule.