1. This is an application to revoke a sanction that has been granted under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts appear to be as follows: On September 1st, 1911, a suit brought by Mr. Thaddeus against the applicant was beard before Harington J., who decreed the suit ex parte. At the conclusion Mr. Buckland, who appeared for Mr. Thaddeus, according to the Court minute, asked for sanction to prosecute Brojendra Nath Saha, under Sections 193,199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code, for having made a false affidavit. The Court according to the minute said, 'Very well.' That suit, as I have already said, was heard on September 1st, 1911; that was on the eve of the long vacation, and the decree was not drawn up till January 6th, 1912. Apparently last year the Court sat for a very few days, owing to the visit of His Majesty the King-Emperor, between the long vacation and the New Year, and the visit of the King-Emperor running into the New Year, according to my recollection, we did not resume work on January 2nd, as we generally do. The decree was filed on January 6th, and an office copy was obtained on January 16th. According to the practice of the Court, sanctions are not embodied in the decree. The office raise difficulties about that, and they refuse to put these other matters into the decree. There having been apparently no formal application before Mr. Justice Harington in the matter, the office refused to draw up the order without formal papers being put in. So, on the 27th May, 1912, a petition was presented to myself, I being then the senior Judge sitting on the Original Side, Harington J. being absent on furlough, asking for the sanction, as to which Harington J. had said, 'Very well,' on September 1st, 1911. According to the minutes I also said, 'Very well', and the order was drawn up, and that is how the matter stands at present. The first question that has been raised is as to whether I had jurisdiction to grant the second sanction. It has been stated, on the authority of the Queen v. Kristna Rau (1872) 7 Mad H. C. R. 58 that a verbal sanction was enough, and therefore, Mr. Justice Harington's sanction having been granted verbally, I had no jurisdiction to grant the sanction on May 27th, 1912. I cannot depart from what I know is the established practice of the Court, that is, to grant these sanctions only on the formal petition being put in, upon which an order can be passed. That I know is the practice in this Court, and the office raise difficulties in drawing up orders where ho formal application is made to the Court. It seems, therefore, I must follow what I know is the established practice of this Court, and hold that I had jurisdiction to pass the order of May 27th, 1912, when the petition, had been placed before the Court. Then it is said that I ought not to have granted sanction because it was so long after September 1st, 1911. Whether, if that point had been called to my attention, that Mr. Thaddeus had been staying his hand between September 1st, 1911, and May 27th, 1912, to apply for his formal order for sanction, I should have given it, I am not now in a position to say. But certainly it does appear to me that is a matter in which the delay should have been explained. However, I made the order, and the order is there, unless I have power and see good grounds for cancelling the same. The first point that has been raised by Mr. Chaudhuri is that I have no power to cancel this order at all, because any application to revoke the sanction ought to be made to the Appellate Bench, and on that point it appears to me that he is supported by the decision in Kali Kinkar Sett v. Dinobandhu Nandy (1905) I.L.R. 32 Calc. 379 which Mr. Norton also relies on, that this Court is not the proper Court to extend time. If I have got no power to extend time under Sub-section (6) of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I have no power to revoke sanction which has been granted. I think that the two cases stand on exactly the same footing, and the case cited by Mr. Norton, being the decision of Sir Francis Maclean C.J., and Sale and Harington JJ., shows that any application to revoke the sanction, if properly granted, ought to be made to an Appellate Bench. The sanction having been -properly granted, I have no jurisdiction to revoke it. Whether some other Court may think that this sanction ought to be revoked, owing to the delay made by Mr. Thaddeus, or for some other reason, it is not for me to say. All that t have to say is that, having properly granted the sanction, I have no power, on the authority of Kali Kinkar Sett v. Dino-bandhu Nandy to revoke the sanction or to extend the time. That being my opinion, the present Rule must fail and must be discharged with costs.