Richard Garth, C.J.
1. In this case we think that there was quite sufficient ground to justify the Court below in presuming a grant of a permanent nature in favour of the defendants' ancestors.
2. It is conceded that the land in question was never let for agricultural purposes. It was apparently let upwards of sixty years ago for building purposes; because it is found that, after the grant (whatever it was), these buildings, which are of a substantial character, were erected some sixty years ago by the defendants' ancestors, and that they and their ancestors have lived there ever since. Under these circumstances we think that the Courts below were at liberty to presume, if they thought fit, that the land was granted for building purposes, and that the grant itself was of a permanent character.
3. This has been explained in several recent cases, and amongst others in the case of Prosonno Coomar Chatterjee v. Jagan Nath Bysack 10 C.L.R. 25 to which our attention has been called.
4. If the land had originally been granted for agricultural purposes, then the defendants would probably had another answer to the suit, namely, that they had acquired a right of occupancy. But as the circumstances under which the original grant was made tend to show that it was made for building purposes, the Courts below were at liberty to presume that the grant was of a permanent nature.
5. In the case mentioned by the learned Judge, which he thought governed this case, it did not appear that the defendants or their ancestors had ever built upon the land or laid out any money upon it. Indeed, it was found by the lower Courts in that case that such kutcha buildings as were upon the land had not been erected by the defendants.
6. We think, therefore, that the decision of the District Judge was right; and that the judgment of this Court should be reversed, the appellants being entitled to the costs of both hearings in this Court.