Pigot and Macpherson, JJ.
1. We do not think it necessary to call upon the learned pleader for the respondent in this case. We think the judgment of the learned District Judge respondent in this case. We think the judgment of the learned District Judge contentions that Section 273 was introduced into the Indian Code for the purpose of showing in what manner the attachment of decrees under the Code shall be made available on behalf of the attaching person This is one of the many cases in which it is much better in following previous decisions simply to say that we follow them instead of discussing them or amplifying language which is already sufficiently complete and satisfactory Therefore we say no more than that we agree with the learned District Judge and follow he decisions on which he has rested his judgment; but we must say, further, that we are wholly unable to understand in what manner the sale of this decree on the application of the Collector could be justified in law. It is true that the point does not appear to have been taken, and it is true that it is unnecessary for the decision of this appeal to determine whether or not Section 411 justices the Court in selling the decree on the application of the Collector; but we think it right to say, so far as we are entitled in this case to express an opinion, that we are unable to see in what way Section 411 justifies the sale of the decree. It stands thus : The State derives a revenue from Court fee stamps There are persons whom it is thought right to exempt by reason of their poverty from payment in the first instance of Court-fee stamps and who are allowed to sue in forma pauperis, and Section 411 provides that persons who have been successful as paupers shall, so far as the subject-matter of their success is concerned, be liable to satisfy, out of what they recover, the amount of the fees which have been for a time, pending the decision of their suit, remitted to them. That is reasonable enough; but if the procedure adopted in this instance were according to law, the successful pauper plaintiff would become simply a machine for the recovery of the value of the Court-fee stamps on behalf of the public treasury, if upon his success the Collector disposes, not of a certain proportion of what the plaintiff has recovered, but sells the whole of the plaintiff's right in the decree which he has got without waiting for the recovery by the plaintiff of the money for which he has got his decree, In that case, if such were the law, all that the pauper plaintiff has done in the case is to get a decree against the defendant, and before he is able to recover the amount of it from the defendant, he is to see the whole benefit of that decree taken from him by the State in order that it may possess itself of the value of the Court-fee stamps remitted to him in the first instance, and (if this be a correct view of the law) remitted to him delusively. We cannot think that this can have been the intention of the Legislature, and we see nothing whatever in the section to justify the sale of the decree obtained by the plaintiff. We dismiss the appeal with costs.