1. The question in the case before us is, what is the nature of the possession of a vendor remaining in possession after the execution of a conveyance by him. That matter seems to have been considered by the Court of Exchequer, in the case of Tew v. Jones 13 M. & W. 12. That case is, in our judgment, an authority for holding that in the case of a sale out and out the vendor remaining in possession, that possession is adverse to the purchaser. That construction is in harmony with the inference to be drawn from Articles 136 and 137, Schedule II of the Limitation Act in this country; and, therefore, having regard to that principle, it must be held that the possession of the defendant was adverse from the 25th September 1867; and that, therefore, when the suit was filed on the 26th September 1879, the plaintiff's claim was barred.
2. We should add that the lower Court misapprehended the expression in the language of the judgment of this Court, which, having regard to the alterations in the terms of the judgment upon the true date of the execution of the deed being ascertained, could not involve the proposition that there could be no adverse possession on behalf of the defendant up to the date, of registration. In the absence of express provisions, we think it could not be held that the commencement of the adverse possession should, by reason of the special provisions of the Registration Act, be deferred until registration, according to the provisions of that Act, was completed. It must date, according to the principle already referred to, from the date of the execution of the deed. The plaintiff's suit, must, therefore, be dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs; each party to bear his own costs.