Richard Garth, C.J.
1. I think that in this case the Munsif has hardly appreciated the nature of the contract.
2. The suit is not for money lent in the ordinary sense of that expression; it is not for a loan repayable at once, or, what is the same thing in point of law, repayable on demand. Articles 57 and 59 of the Limitation Act are only applicable, in my opinion, to cases of that kind.
3. The contract here set up by the plaintiff is one of a special nature. In consideration of a present advance by him, the defendant is said to have agreed to repay the money at the end of a year with interest.
4. This being the contract, it is clear that the plaintiffs would have no right of suit until the expiration of the year; and therefore it would seem obviously unjust, and contrary to the meaning of the Limitation Act, that limitation should run, not from the time when the plaintiff's right of action accrued, but from the time when the advance was made, which was the consideration for the defendant's promise.
5. Suppose that by a contract of this nature, instead of the money being repayable at the end of one year, it were repayable at the end of four years. It is clear, that if the Munsif were right in his construction of Article 57, the plaintiff, however honest and bond fide his bargain may have been, would never have a right to enforce it, because by the time when his right to sue accrued, it would be barred by limitation.
6. In England, by the Statute of Frauds, a contract which is not to be performed within three years from the making thereof, must necessarily be in writing.
7. But here we have no Statute of Frauds; and in commercial affairs people are at liberty to make any verbal contracts they please.
8. And it seems to me, that it could never have been the intention of the Legislature to prohibit verbal contracts by means of an Act which was passed for a totally different purpose, and which merely professes to regulate the time within which different suits are to be brought.
9. I think that this case is governed by Article 115, which virtually provides for the case of all contracts which are not in writing, registered, and not otherwise specifically provided for.
10. I have had some doubt in this case as to whether the suit is properly one for compensation; but, looking at what was decided in Nobo-coomar Mookhopadhaya v. Siru Mullick I.L.R. 6 Cal. 94 I am inclined to agree in the view taken by the learned Chief Justice. I quite think, that it cannot and ought not to be inferred that the Legislature intended to prohibit verbal contracts of this nature, merely because there is no express provision in respect to them in the Limitation Act. See the remarks in Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan I.L.R. 7 Cal. 256 (261).