Richard Garth, C.J.
1. We have had some difficulty in determining what is the true meaning of the decree in this case.
2. It may be that it was the intention of the learned Judge who made it to allow the plaintiff to pay his mortgage-money and interest when he chose; but we are bound to put a construction upon the language of the decree itself, and we think that the words 'up to the time of payment hereinafter mentioned' can refer to no other time of payment than that which is mentioned later on in that part of the decree which relates to the reconveyance of the property; and the time of payment there mentioned seems, according to the best construction that we can put upon the sentence, a time after the Registrar has made his report, because the sum to be paid is to be a sum reported to be due by the Registrar.
3. After the able arguments which have been addressed to us in this case, and the difficulty which we feel even now in saying what the decree really means, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the decree has not been drawn as clearly as it might have been. We only hope that the difficulty which we have had, and the expense which has been occasioned to the parties, will operate as a wholesome warning in the future.
4. It is true that the parties themselves care, to some extent, in fault, for having approved of the decree in its present shape; but each party may possibly have construed it in his own way, and been perfectly content with it according to his own construction.
5. The report, therefore, of the Registrar will be confirmed as it originally stood, and we think that each party must pay his own costs of this appeal on scale 2.