Renupada Mukherjee, J.
1. Those two analogous appeals have arisen under the following circumstances: -
2. The three respondents who arc trusses to the Naik Trust 109, Narkeldanga North Road brought two analogous suite for ejectment after service of notices to quit against appellant Sister Louise from flats Nos. 7 and 8 of premises No. 220 Lower Circular Road en the ground that she was a defaulter. There was also a claim for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits in both the suits. The rent of each of the flats was admittedly Rs. 150/- per month.
3. The defendant denied that she was a defaulter and pleaded that the notices served upon lier were not vslid and sufficient. The defence against ejectment was struck off in both the suits in consequence of an application filed by the landlords under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, but the appellant was permitted to contest the suits on the other ground, viz,, that the notices for ejectment were neither valid nor sufficient. The learned Munsif held that the notices were not valid and sufficient and in that view of the 'matter he dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs for ejectment and passed a decree for arrears of rent with proportionate costs.
4. The plaintiffs preferred two appeals and the lower Appellate Court having taken a different view from the Munsif on the question of the validity of the notices allowed the appeals and decreed the suits of the plaintiffs in full.
5. The defendant has filed these two second appeals from the decrees passed by the lower Appellate Court. The appeals were heard analogously in this court as the subject matter of the two appeals was practically the same.
6. Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the defendant appellant contended that the lower Appellate Court committed an error in law in holding that the notices served upon the appellant were valid and sufficient. This question has arisen in the following manner:-
7. It is not disputed that the landlords gave clear 15 day's notice to the appellant to quit the disputed flats as required by Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Mukherjee contended that this statutory period of 15 days was varied by mutual agreement between the parties and the term of the variation was that either party must give at least one full calendar month's notice for determination of the tenancies. In support of this contention Mr. Mukherjee relief on some conditions printed in the rent receipt admittedly given by the plaintiffs respondents to the appellant. The rent receipts filed by the appellant viz. Ex. A scries would show that 8 such conditions are printed therein. The conditions nos. 3 and 6 are relevant for our purpose and they are reproduced here.
Condition no. 3: One month's previous notice in writing to be given before vacating a place on the date on which the tenancy expires. Condition no. 6: A tenant vacating a place before completing his whole tenancy of a month will have to pay rent for the full month together with an additional month's rent for which he is required to give notice under Clause 3 above.
8. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that these two conditions by which the period of notice has been varied are binding not only upon the tenant but upon the landlords as well, otherwise there would be one period of notice for the tenant and a different one for the landlords. In my opinion this contention is without any substance. All the 8 conditions printed in the rent receipts, if read carefully, would show that they are meant to be the obligations of the tenant only and not of the landlords. All that conditions Nos. 3 and 6 connote is that if the tenant wishes to determine the tenancy, he or she must give at least one full calendar month's notice to the landlords. In my opinion these conditions do not vary the statutory period of notice so far as the landlords are concerned.
9. Mr. Mukherjee next argued that as soon as the period of notice is varied in the case of one party the matter is taken out of the domain of statute and the landlord is bound to give reasonable notice to the tenant for vacating the premises which, in this particular case, should be the same as the tenant is required to give under the varied contract 'evidenced by the printed conditions appearing on the rent receipts. In my view this contention cannot also be accepted as correct or sound. By an agreement the period of notice may certainly be made longer in the case of the tenant than in the case of the landlord. It cannot be argued that because the period of notice in this case was made longer in the case of the tenant than the statutory period of 15 days, the period was necessarily enlarged in the case of the landlords - as well and they were debarred from availing themselves of the statutory period of 15 days. In my opinion a landlord - can avail himself of the statutory period of notice unless that period is also varied by agreement, express or implied. This view is supported by an unreported decision in Second Appeal No. 1144 of 1948, Kanailal Sur v. Parannidhi Sadhukhan (Gal) (A). Das Gupta J., held in that case if the conditions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are to be varied, it is necessary that there would be a clear contract to that effect, whether express or implied, and the fact that there is a -contract which entitles the lessor to a longer period does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that the lessee would also be entitled to a similar term. I respectfully agree with this decision and hold that the statutory period of 15 days' notice was not varied in this case by any contract, either express or implied, so far as the landlords are concerned. In view of the matter it must be held that the notice given to the appellant was valid and sufficient- The decrees passed by the lower Appellate Court are therefore correct in law and I must be maintained.
10. In the result these two appeals are dismissed.
11. Considering the circumstances of the cases I do not make any order as to costs.