1. In this case the District Judge was of opinion that the notice to quit was bad, merely because the period allowed did not expire at the end of the year. He relies upon certain cases quoted in his judgment. With reference to the case of Rajendronath Mookhopadhya v. Bassider Ruhman Khondkar I.L.R. 2 Cal. 146; S.C. 25 W.R. 330 we have to observe that the question referred to the Full Bench was--'Whether a ryot, whose tenancy can only be determined by a reasonable notice to quit expiring at the end of the year, can claim to have a suit brought against him by the landlord dismissed on the ground that ho has had no such notice,' etc. This assumed that the ryot in that particular case was entitled to a reasonable notice to quit expiring at the end of the year. No question was raised or decided as to whether, as a general principle, a notice to quit, in order to be reasonable, must expire at the end of the year. Then, in the case of Janoo Mundur v. Brijo Singh 22 W.R. 548 Phear, J. said:
2. We perceive that it,' that is, the notice, 'was served upon the defendant in the month of Pous, three whole months before the expiration of the year, and therefore was, in respect of time, reasonably sufficient notice to quit.'It appears to us that the learned Judge considered the notice to be reasonable in that case, not because it expired at the end of the year, but because it was a three months' notice. The other cases quoted by the District Judge do not, in our opinion, establish the proposition that a notice to quit given to a tenant other than an occupancy ryot must, in order to be reasonable, expire at the end of the year. We think that the result of the cases is, that such a ryot is entitled to a reasonable notice. What is reasonable notice is a question of fact which must be decided, in each case according to the particular circumstances and the local customs as to reaping crops and letting land. In the present case a three months' notice was given, and there was no contention that, at the time when that notice expired, any crop was upon the ground, the necessity of removing which would have made the notice under the circumstances unreasonable. Further, the notice did, as a matter of fact, expire within seven days of the close of the year, and the facts of the case, therefore, are very similar to the case of Janoo Mundur v. Brijo Singh 22 W.R. 548.
3. We think, therefore, that the decree of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and this appeal decreed with costs.
4. This judgment will admittedly govern Appeal No. 2432 of 1880.