1. The District Judge has dismissed this suit, on the ground that this was a suit for enhancement, and no notice required by Section 14 of the Rent Law had been served. It appears to us that the terms of the contract between the parties, under which the tenancy of the defendant was created, dispenses with the necessity for such notice. The case is precisely similar to that decided by a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Morris, J., and myself, in Appeal No. 759 of 1878. In that judgment we expressed ourselves to the following effect: 'There is no provision as to the necessity of previous notice or even to the presence of the tenant at the time of measurement. The tenant unreservedly stipulates to pay at a certain rate per kani for any such land as upon measurement may be found to be in excess of the estimated area. Under the contract the time of discovery of the excess land by means of measurement is the moment from which he engages to pay additional rent for such excess land. The view thus taken that the special terms of the ryot's kabuliat dispenses with the necessity of a notice in terms of the Rent Law is in accordance with the judgment of a, Division Bench of this Court in Ram Narain Lall v. Gumbeer Singh 19 W.R. 108.' In accordance with the precedent of that decision, we set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, and restore that of the first Court. The plaintiff will receive the costs of this Court and of the lower Appellate Court.
2. I concur. I think that this case is not similar to the case of Thekmee Beldar v. Ram Kishen Lall 15 W.R. 71 upon which the District Judge relies. In that case there was no express agreement to pay additional rent for additional land. Nor is this case precisely similar to the Full Bench case of Nistarini Dasi v. Bonomali Chatterji I.L.R. 4 Cal. 941. It is similar to Special Appeal, No. 759 of 1878, referred to by Prinsep, J. In that case the patta or kabuliat was for a term of ten years, in the present case it is a maurasi kabuliat. Now, a maurasi lease is, according to the custom of this country, a permanent lease. It appears to me, therefore, that the written engagement in this case does, by necessary implication, specify the period of such engagement, and that the provisions of Section 15 of the Rent Law requiring a notice do not apply.