1. These appeals have arisen out of applications under Section 47, Civil P. C., made in proceedings in execution of decrees. The decrees sought to be executed were passed in suits for rent; and the question raised by the persons against whom the decrees were sought to be executed, appellants in this Court, was that they were not liable under the decrees put into execution; that the decrees could not in law be allowed to be executed against them. The facts necessary for the purpose of a decision of this question arising for consideration in these appeals, may be very shortly stated. The decrees for rent, were passed against the three daughters of one Radhajiban Mustafi, whose estate is now in the hands of the appellants as the ultimate reversioners of Radhajiban. Of the three daughters of Radhajiban, Bhababhabini survived her sisters, and she divested herself of her estate in favour of the reversioners. It would appear that the reversioners had divided the estate of Radhajiban as amongst themselves with the assent of the sole surviving daughter of Radhajiban, Bhababhabini. The properties attached and sought to be sold in the proceedings in execution giving rise to these appeals, were by virtue of the arrangement come to by the reversioners amongst themselves claimed by the appellants as their separate property, against which the execution of the decrees obtained against the three daughters of Radhajiban could not be allowed to proceed.
2. The arrangement as to division of properties between the reversioners was evidenced by two documents, Exs. A and B; in the case in paraSection 12, 13 and 14 of the document Ex. B, arrangement in regard to the payment of decretal dues and other dues for and against the parties to the document, the reversioners, subsisting before the arrangement was made. The appellants in this Court, who raised objection to the execution of the decrees against them, undertook liabilities which included liability in respect of the decretal debt which was sought to be realised in the execution proceeding with which we are concerned. The appellants it would appear to be clear from the contents of the documents Exs. A and B agreed in unmistakable language to treat the properties in their hands as part of Radhajiban's estate. On the clear stipulations contained in documents Exs. A and B the appellants could not be allowed to say that the properties sought to be proceeded against in execution, were separate or self-acquired properties and were therefore exempt from being proceeded against in execution of decrees for rent due, so far as properties which were admittedly left by Radhajiban, and were in the hands of Radhajiban's daughters, at the time when the decrees were passed.
3. It was urged in support of the appeals that even though the documents Exs. A and B had the effect of fixing liability on the appellants, the decree-holders, as strangers to the contract evidenced by those documents, could not get the benefit from such a contract in proceedings in execution of decrees. That there is no necessity for having recourse to a separate suit for enforcing the contract, in the matter of satisfaction of the decretal debt, goes without saying; and the argument in support of the position that there is necessity for a suit for establishment of contractual liability does not bear serious examination, in view of the scope of Section 47, Civil P. C. The right of strangers to a contract has to be determined in the case before us with reference to the state of facts on which the right of the decree-holders to proceed against the properties in the hands of the appellants is based. The appellants obtained possession of the properties by virtue of relinquishment by a female limited owner during her lifetime, upon the express condition that they should pay her debts. Upon general principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the appellants were bound to pay the decretal debt in regard to which execution was levied in the case before us [see in this connection Chintamoni Dutt v. Mohes Chandra Banerjee (1896) 23 Cal 454.], and in our judgment there can be no doubt, and it can be taken to be well settled on principle and authorities, that a stranger to a contract which is to his benefit is entitled to enforce the agreement to his benefit, apart from the position that the party concerned accepted liability in the matter of satisfaction of debt due to the stranger (see Bibhuti Bhusan Ghose v. Baikunta Nath Mondal (1935) 62 C L J 55., and the cases referred to therein). In the case before us, the appellants had by virtue of the clear stipulations contained in the documents Exs. A and B accepted liability so far as the decretal debts in question were concerned.
4. In the above view of the case before us, we affirm the decision arrived at by the District Judge in the Court of appeal below, that the proceedings in execution, giving rise to these appeals, should be allowed to proceed, as competent. The appeals are dismissed with costs. The hearing fee in these appeals is assessed at three gold mohurs. In view of the decision we have arrived at in these appeals, it is not necessary to decide the points arising on the cross-objections preferred by the respondents in this Court. The cross-objections are allowed to be withdrawn, without any order as to costs in the same.