Charles Chitty, J.
1. The only question in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiffs were the Dar patnidars and they were suing the Zemindar and the Patnidars for possession of certain Chowkidari Chakran lands which had bier resumed and settled by Government with' the Zemindar. In their plaint the plaintiffs stated that the Settlement was made by the Government under the provisions of Acts VI of 1870 on 16th May l999 and they further alleged that the cause of action arose oil that day, The suit was originally filed in the Munsifs Court on 15th May 1911, one day within 12 years from the data specified in the plaint. On 4th May 1912 the plaint was returned by the Munsif for presentation to the proper Court, the Munsif finding that he had no jurisdiction. The' Munsif directed that it should be presented to the proper Court within one month. The plaint was actually filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court on 1st June 1912.
2. Two questions arose? (1) whether the Munsif had any authority to extend the period of limitation for one month or any other time, and (2) what Article of the Limitation Act applies to the' suit and whether it is barred by time.
3. As to the first point, it is clear that; the Munsif could have no such power. If any Court had power to alter the period' within which a suit might be presented,' the Limitation Act would soon become a dead letter. It was suggested that the' Munsif might Have such power under Section 151 of the new Code arid were told that a Bench of this Court had expressed such an opinion. The case is not reported; but there is a reported case, Hqridas Roy v. Sarat Chandra Roy (2) 18 Ind. cas.121; 170 w. N. 515, which takes a contrary view and distinctly lays down that the only period which can be excluded is that provided for in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. With this opinion we entirely agree. In that view of the case, excluding under Section (4 the period from 15th May 19ll to 4th May J 912, in order to be within time the suit must have been filed in the proper Court at the latest on the 5th May. Being filed on 1st June 1912 it was clearly out of time if the time runs from 15th May, as alleged by the plaintiffs in their plaint. In the Court of first instance, as also in the lower Appellate Court, this was the case which was put forward by the plaintiffs. In second appeal it has been urged on their behalf that the date should not be from the actual settlement by the Government with the Zamindar but from some subsequent date not specified, when it is said that the Zemindar's possession became adverse to the Putnidars and the Dar-putnidars. It was suggested by the appellants' Pleader that it might be 28th August 1911, when the Zemindar first settled the lands.
4. This is a case not made in the Courts below and, as I have said, no date was specified nor have any facts been put before the Court which would justify such a conclusion. Bat it is really immaterial to go into that question, because it is clear that time was running against the Dar patnidars from the date of the settlement. We were referred to the case of Ranjit Singh v. Mahnaja Bahadur Singh (l). That was a ease under appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from a Bench of this Court of which I was a member. In that case another Bench of this Court in an interlocutory matter had expressed an opinion that Article 113 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act (the Article dealing with specific performance of contracts) Applied and not Article 141 (the Article dealing with recovery of possession of immovable property). This Court held that Article 144 applied and that opinion was affirmed by the Judicial Committee. It does not appear that any question was raised in that can that the period of limitation would run from any date other than that of the settlement with the Zemindar. In my opinion, it is clear that that must be the starting point of limitation. To hold otherwise would be to extend the period indefinitely; for instance, in the case of the Zamindar holding the lands in khas and not doing anything, which was obviously hostile to the title, of the Putnidars or the Dar-putnidars., Taking that to be the starting point of limitation, which was moreover the point taken by the plaintiffs themselves before., they come to this Court, the suit is clearly, barred and the appeal must, in my opinion, fail.
5. The appeal for the appellants was argued; yesterday by Babu Dwarkanath Chackrabutty. He asked leave to allow his arguments to be continued this morning by his junior. We were not disposed to grant that request. There did not seem to be any reason why he should not appear here and continue his argument if incomplete, but we did give permission to his junior to cite two oases which he mentioned but had not been able to cite last evening. It is now objected that we have this morning declined to hear from the junior Pleader further arguments. In my opinion we are perfectly justified in so doing, and he could not claim to be heard
6. The appeal is dismissed with costs, Nos. 853, 854. and 855.,
7. The only question arising in: these appeals is as to the assessment of the mesne profits in favour of the plaintiffs as the result of their decree. The point taken is clearly set pat in the second and third grounds of appeal. It is urged that the lower Appellate Court ha3 assessed the Zemindar's share of the profits of the lands on a wrong principle and that in assessing the Zemindar's dues the lower Appellate Court should not have taken into consideration the present produce of the lands but ought to have gone upon the letting value of those lands at the time of the resumption by the Collector. It is not now suggested that the time of the origin of the Puntni or Dar-punti should be taken. It has not been, seriously Contended on the other side that this is not correct or that the sum at which the Collector valued the produce of these lands at the time of the resumption should not be taken as the basis. The parties came to an agreement in the first Court with regard to the amount payable as between the Zemindar and the Putnidars, and to that the appellants are willing to adhere. The result is that the variation of the decrees of the first Court by the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and the decrees of the first Court restored in all these cases with costs in this Court against the defendant No. 1 and the heirs and legal representatives of defendant No. 2 and in the lower Appellate Court against the defendant No. 1 only.
8. I agree.