1. This Rule is at the instance of a tenant who complained under Section 34 of stoppage of water by the landlord. He mentioned 25-1-1951, as the time when this was done. His petition before the Rent Controller under Section 34, West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950 was on 29-1-1951. 'Prima facie', no question of limitation arises. No issue as to limitation under Section 34 was ever raised before the Rent Controller. The learned Subordinate Judge without proper appreciation of what was being done by the Rent Controller held that the occurrence related to violation of an order passed in 1949 by Mr. S.K. Neogi but the judgment of the learned Rent Controller itself will show that what the Rent Controller meant was that instead of carrying out what Mr, Neogi had previously ordered in 1949 the landlord further harassed his tenant by an additional act of plugging the tenant's pipe this time. He says: 'it appears that the landlord instead of plugging his pipe plugged the pipe of the petitioner.' It is abundantly clear therefore that the question of limitation was misunderstood by the learned Subordinate Judge.
2. The learned Subordinate Judge's second reason for upsetting the order of the learned Rent Controller was that the Rent Controller's order was without jurisdiction. His argument is this: On the side of the landlord, the landlord and another witness were examined. On the side of the tenant, the tenant examined himself. From this if the learned Subordinate Judge had said that he was not accepting the tenant's story one could have understood what he meant. He goes on to say that it is because of this that the order of the Rent Controller was without jurisdiction. Obviously, the learned Subordinate Judge after so many years of service has not a clear idea of what the word 'jurisdiction' means. It is time that he began to learn the meaning of that word.
3. Another reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge in upsetting the learned Rent Controller's order was that Rule 9 framed by the local Government under Section 47, Rent Control Act of 1950 was 'ultra vires' as it offended against Section 5, Criminal P.C. I need not go into the question whether Section 34, Rent Control Act of 1950 creates an offence or not. Even assuming without deciding that point, that it is an offence, Section 5 is definitely made 'subject to enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, enquiring into or trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' Rules made under Section 47 of the Act being statutory rules are a part of the enactment itself. Therefore, Section 5 is to be read subject to the rules, instead of the rules being read subject to Section 5. It is unnecessary for me to examine some decisions under the 1920 Act, which dealt with a quite different matter, discussed by the learned Subordinate Judge. The whole discussion is irrelevant because the clear wording of Section 5 even if Section 34 creates an offence, would save what has been done under the statutory power by the local Government, instead of making it 'ultra vires'.
4. It therefore appears that the learnedSubordinate Judge is very much confusedabout the whole case and his decision cannotstand. His order is therefore set aside. TheRule is made absolute and the appeal is sentback to be heard by some other competentCourt. Costs will abide the result.