D.N. Sinha, J.
1. The petitioners in this case are a Hindu deity and his shebaits. It appears that the deity Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew is the owner of premises Nos. 128. 129, 130. 130/1, 131/2 and 132 Canning Street. Calcutta. It will thus appear that the ownership of the deity extended to six different municipal premises numbered as above. These premises were assessed separately. On or about the 20-9-1956 a notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner II of the Corporation of Calcutta, in respect of these premises, under Section 175 read with proviso (i) to Section 207 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951. It was a notice to the effect that the said premises were proposed to be amalgamated into one single municipal premises, numbered as 128 Canning Street, for purposes of valuation from the fourth quarter of 1956-57. It was further stated that any person dissatisfied with the proposed amalgamation may make his objection. Objection was preferred on behalf of the deity acting through his shebaits. On or about 27-10-1956 there was a hearing of the objection. On or about 9-1-1957, notice was issued under Section 180 of the said Act, by the Assessor to the Corporation, stating that the valuation of the amalgamated premises had been revised and the premises had been assessed at an annual value of Rs. 4465/- and that anybody objecting to it might prefer his objection according to law. The position as to amalgamation is as follows.
2. Previous to the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, it did not matter much to the Corporation if one single premises was split up into more than one. In fact, premises which were let cut to separate tenants were usually assessed separately as different municipal premises. Under the amended Act, there is a olockate and it is to the interest of the Corporation that so far as practicable there should be as little subdivision as is possible. Therefore, buildings which are in fact one building but subdivided into many premises, have now been amalgamated again into one unit, thus increasing the municipal valuation. This is what has happened in this case also. The objection taken here is similar to the objection in the case of Arathoon Mackertoon Arathoon v. Corporation of Calcutta : AIR1957Cal79 (A). The point is as to whether the Commissioner has the power to amalgamate the premises and make an assessment on the footing of such amalgamation. In my judgment in the above case, I have held that reading Section 175, together with the proviso to Section 207 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 1951 I am inclined to the opinion that the Commissioner has the power of amalgamation of municipal premises and to make assessment of such amalgamated premises. In that case I stilted that for the purposes thereof it was not necessary finally to determine the point. However I see no reason to change my opinion upon the point, and I must hold that the Commissioner has such power. I must however hasten to correct one error that has crept into that decision. Either by reason of a typographical error or inadvertently it has been stated that power under Section 175 cannot be delegated, under Section 34 of the Act. Although it did not in any way affect the actual decision, this was not correct, because under Section 34 this power can be delegated. In Arathoon's case (A), (supra), it was in fact not delegated. My decision was followed by G.K. Mitter. J.. in Corporation of Calcutta v. Mohammed Ommer, Suit No. 4600 of 1951, DA 29-3-1956 (Cal) (B). In that case also it appeared that there was no valid delegation. The position, therefore is as follows :
(1) Under the provisions of Section 175 read with proviso (i) to Section 207 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 power is vested in the Commissioner to amalgamate or cause to be amalgamated land or building bearing two or more municipal numbers into one or more new premises.
(2) Power is vested in the Commissioner to assess the new premises upon such amalgamation subject to the conditions laid down in Section 175.
(3) This power of the Commissioner can be delegated, but it must be delegated in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of the Act.
3. Mr. Chose appearing on behalf of the petitioners argues that I should reconsider my decision because of the following reasons : Firstly, he says that this is a taxing provision and therefore unless there is an express power to amalgamate, no such power can be spelt out by implication. This is an aspect of the matter which I have already dealt with in Arathoon's case (A) (supra). I have pointed out that Section 175 and Section 207 (2) are not charging sections and by themselves do not impose the tax. They may be steps required for the purposes of assessment and I find no reason to hold that even such powers cannot be given by implication. The next point taken by Mr. Ghose was that the delegation here is conditional. The actual delegation is set out in Ext. A annexed to the affidavit of Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee affirmed on 17-1-1958. The Commissioner has delegated his powers, duties and functions as set forth therein to the officers mentioned, 'subject to my control and supervision'. Mr. Ghose argues that a delegation which is subject to supervision and control is no delegation at all. He cites the case of State v. Basdeo : AIR1951All44 (C). There is a passage in the judgment which states that delegation of legislative functions, whichis subject to supervision and control of the Legislature, is no delegation at all. In my opinion, thathas reference only to delegation of legislative functions, and not executive functions. So far as executive functions are concerned, a delegation is oftenmade subject to supervision and control of higherofficers and I find no defect in it. In this case, thepower has been delegated both to amalgamate premises as well as to make an assessment. I find nodefect in the instrument of delegation. In the casementioned above, decided by Mitter, J., the matterwas governed by the 1923 Act. which required aresolution of the Corporation, but there are no suchlimitations in the 1951 Act so far as Section 175 isconcerned. Therefore, no grounds have been shownfor my interference and this application must bedismissed: Rule discharged and interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs.