Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.
1. In the reference, two questions have been referred to the court :
'(1) Whether on a proper interpretation of entry (2) of the Sixth Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal was right in holding that the expression 'aluminium' occurring in entry (2) of the Sixth Schedule to the said Act denotes merely the aluminium metal and not aluminium articles ?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper interpretation of Section 80B(1) read with entry (2) of the Sixth Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the business of manufacture and sale of aluminium articles cannot be considered as a priority industry within the meaning of the said provisions of the said Act and the assessee-company is not entitled to relief under Section 80-I of the said Act ?'
2. Counsel for the assessee drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Bharat (now State of Madhya Pradesh) v. Hiralal : 2SCR752 . He also drew our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. CTO  11 STC 827. The Kerala High Court had an occasion to consider this question in the case of CIT v. Mittal Steel Re-rolling and Allied Industries (P.) Ltd. : 108ITR207(Ker) , where the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was concerned with re-rolling of steel into mild steel rods and steel sections. The question was whether the same was the manufacture or production of 'iron and steel (metal)'. The said question was again considered by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. West India Steel Co. Ltd. : 108ITR601(Ker) , where the Full Beach was concerned with the question whether the conversion of steel ingots and billets into M.S. rods and steel sections by machinery is manufacture of 'iron and steel (metal) '.
3. It appears that so far as this court is concerned in the case of Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. CIT : 108ITR802(Cal) this court has held that wife rods were not iron and steel but metal and is not entitled to a special rebate. Iron and steel as mentioned in Schedule VI of the I.T. Act, 1961, is entitled to special rebate. If the ratio of the said decision is applied to the controversy in this case then the contention of the asses-see cannot be accepted. Counsel for the assessee, however, sought to urge that the said decision would not be applicable because the court was concerned with ' iron and steel (metal) ' and the court was influenced by the fact that other finished products of iron and steel had been specifically mentioned in the various items of the Sixth Schedule of the I.T. Act, 1961. Counsel urged that in the case of aluminium there is no separate item dealing with aluminium products and, therefore, aluminium utensils produced out of the metal aluminium will be considered to be aluminium (metal) as contemplated in the Sixth Schedule of the I.T. Act, 1961. On the other hand, it appears that in the case of iron and steel certain items which would not come within the concept of metal of iron and steel had been mentioned separately and specifically in the Sixth Schedule in order to clarify the intention of the Legislature that they would also be brought within the ambit of the Sixth Schedule. That factor in our opinion does not in the facts and circumstances of the case entitle this court to say that the ratio of the decision of this court in the case of Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. CIT : 108ITR802(Cal) would not be applicable to this case.
4. Counsel further submitted that in case of ambiguity an entry should be construed in favour of the assessee in order to give him larger relief. He drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd. reported in : 77ITR318(AP) . This argument also it appears was advanced before this court in the case of Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. CIT and was rejected as it was found that there was no ambiguity.
5. Applying the ratio of the said decisions of this court, question No. 1 must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and, applying the said decision to the facts of this case, question No. 2 must also be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue Parties, however, will bear and pay their own costs.
Sudhindra Mohan Guha, J.
6. I agree.