Tottenham and Ghose, JJ.
1. These are appeals against an order of the lower Court, appointing a receiver to take charge of the property held by the defendants on a lease, in suits brought against them under Section 52 of the Rent Law for recovery of arrears of rent and for ejectment.
2. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that Section 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, under which the order appealed against has been made, is not applicable to these suits. He says that the suits are really for arrears of rent only, and the ejectment of the defendants is merely incidental upon the nonpayment of the amount of the decree, whatever it may be, within fifteen days from the date of the decree. He also contends that Section 503 of the Code is not applicable at all to suits brought under the Rent Act. He points out that before the passing of Act X of 1859, the landlord himself had the power under the old Regulations to appoint private receivers called sazawals, but that that power was taken away by Act X of 1859; and that in Act X of 1859 it does not appear that revenue officers, who under that Act had to try rent suits, had any power to appoint receivers; and the learned Counsel seems to contend that the present law also excludes even the Civil Courts from the power to appoint receivers. As to this matter we think it clear, on the words of Section 34 of the Rent Law of 1869, that all the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure apply to suits brought under that Act, save as in the Act otherwise provided. There is no specific provision in Bengal Act VIII of 1869 which excludes the operation of Section 503 in express terms. The learned counsel, however, contends that Sections 23 and 52 of the Rent Law of 1869 together do in effect exclude the operation of Section 503 of the Civil Procedure Code; for Section 23 provides that no lease of a farmer or other landholder, not bearing a permanent or transferable interest in land, 'shall be cancelled, nor the lease-holder ejected otherwise than in execution of a decree or order under the provisions of the Act;' and Section 52 says that 'the decree for ejectment shall specify the amount of the arrear, and if such amount, together with interest and costs of suit, be paid into Court within fifteen days from the date of the decree, execution shall be stayed.' It is argued that the appointment of a receiver is tantamount to the ejectment of the lease-holder, and is therefore opposed to the provisions of Sections 23 and 52. If the suit were simply for the recovery of arrears of rent, there is no doubt that Section 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply. But it seems to us clear that the suit really is one for the recovery of the tenure itself, and therefore Section 503 will apply, unless Mr. Bell is right in his contention that it is excluded by Sections 23 and 52 of the Rent Law. We are of opinion that these sections do not exclude the operation of Section 503 of the Code. The appointment of a receiver is not, we think, the same thing as the cancelment of a lease, or the ejectment of a lease-holder. As pointed out by the learned Counsel on the other side, the possession of the receiver is not adverse to the lease-holder, and could not be pleaded against him in any question of limitation. The possession of the receiver is for the benefit of the parties to the suit. We think, therefore, that the Court below had discretion to appoint a receiver in the cases before us. That being so, we dismiss the appeal with costs.