1. This is a petition under Section 32(4) of the Rent Control Act for revision of an order of a learned Judge made on appeal in proceedings for fixation of standard rent.
2. The landlord applied for the fixation of standard rent of premises No. 53 Harrison Road which were in the possession of the opposite party, as a tenant. The premises were let in 1934 at a rental of Rs. 185/- and that rent has been paid ever since. The proceedings were commenced before the Rent Control Act of 1950 came into force and the judgment of the Rent Controller was also given before the 1950 Act was in force. An appeal was pending when the 1950 Act came into force and by reason of Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act the appellate Court was bound to apply the provisions of the 1950 Act relating to the fixation of standard rent, and that has been done.
3. As I have already said the application is for revision of the order of the appellate Judge under the provisions of Section 32(4) of the 1950 Act. But this Court has held that that sub-section gives no right to revise an appellate order which was made in proceedings which were instituted before the 1950 Act came into force. These proceedings are governed by the 1948 Act except for the provision which I have already referred to contained in Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act. There was no right of revision under the 1948 Act and this Court has already held in a case similar to the present that no revision at all lies to this Court.
4. Mr. Panchanan Chowdhury however has urged us to treat this application as an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is no application before us under that Article and in the circumstances of this case we are not inclined to interfere though we could under powers given by that Article.
5. Mr. Choudhury's argument is that the appellate Judge in this case had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it was an appeal governed by the 1948 Act and the appellate Judge was not a person who could hear the appeal. The appeals under the 1948 Act lay to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in the Presidency area who could transfer the appeals to persons who were notified by Government under sub-section (2) of Section 32 as persons who could hear appeals. Under the 1950 Act the Chief Judge could transfer the case to any of the Judges of the Small Cause Court and that is what he did in this case. He transferred the case to one of the ordinary Judges of the Court. It may be that the appellate Judge in this case had no jurisdiction to hear this case. But should we interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution? It has been held that interference should be rare under that section and that the Court should only act in cases where there would be a grave miscarriage of justice if the Court did not interfere.
6. In the present case it appears to me that the Court with jurisdiction would have to find that the basic rent of these premises was Rs. 185/ per mensem. That was the rent payable on December 1, 1941. Mr. Chowdhury has suggested that it was a nominal rent. But I am wholly unable to understand now a substantial rent of Rs. 185/ can be described as nominal. It may have been a somewhat inadequate rent. But that is not a nominal rent. It is suggest ed that the rent was low because of the relationship existing between the parties. But there is nothing in the 1950 Act which would entitle a Court to disregard the rent payable on December 1, 1941 because it was somewhat lower than it might have been. It can be disregarded if the case falls within Section 9(1) (e) of the 1950 Act. But clearly this case does not. That being so, by reason of Section 9 (1) (a) and Sch. A the Court would be bound to fix the basic rent at Rs. 185/-. The standard rent is therefore only a matter of calculation, namely, ten per cent, over that figure and that is what has been allowed.
7. Further it may be pointed out that the Kent Controller was satisfied after comparing the rent of these premises with other premises that this rent of Rs. 185/- was not unduly low on December 1, 1941. That being so it appears to me that even if we send this appeal back with a direction- that it should be reheard the result would be the same. We cannot be asked to interfere under Article 227 where interference would have eventually no effect on the decision at all.
8. That being so we decline to interfere under Art. 227 of the Constitution and as no revision under Section 32(4) of the 1950 Act lies this petition must fail and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged with costs. Let the affidavit in reply filed in Court today be kept on the record.
G.N. Das, J.
9. I agree.