1. The plaintiffs instituted this suit on the 3rd December 1879 to recover arrears of rent for the years 1284, 1285, and 1286 F. S. (corresponding with the years 1876 to 1879). The defendants alleged, that the rents for the years 1284 and 1285 (1876-1878) had been paid in full, and that of the year 1286 (1878-79) having been deposited under the provisions of the Rent Act, the notice of such deposit was given to the plaintiffs on the 31st May 1879. They pleaded that the suit, not having been instituted within six months from the 31st May 1879, was barred under the provisions of Section 31 of the Rent Act.
2. The Munsif held, that the suit was barred, while the Judge on appeal came to the contrary conclusion. The latter officer based his decision on the ground that the deposit of the rent of the year 1286 (1878-79) was not legal under the Act, because it had not then become due.
3. It is contended before us that the Judge is wrong in assuming without evidence that the rent was not due. Although we are of opinion that the Judge ought not to have made any assumption of fact without taking evidence, still we think upon another ground that his conclusion is right. The last day of the six months from the 31st May 1879 fell upon an authorised holiday, and the suit was instituted on the first day the Court re-opened.
4. Under these circumstances, we think that the suit should be deemed to have been instituted within the time limited by the law. The days during which a Court remains closed should be considered as non-existent. It is but reasonable to hold this, otherwise great injustice might be done. Take for instance a case like this. A plaintiff' comes to file his plaint on the last day allowed by law, and finds that the Court has been closed unexpectedly. It would be manifestly unjust to throw out his Plaint if filed on the next day the Court re-opened, as barred by limitation.
5. This Court has acted upon this principle in the cases of Hossein Ally v, Donzelle (I. L. Rep., 5 Cal., 906) and Dabee Rawoot v. Heeramun Muhatoon (8 W. R., 223). We are aware of contrary ruling in Purran Ghimder Ghosc v. Mutty Lall Ghose Jahira (I. L. R., 4 Calc, 50). This last-mentioned case was decided when Act IX of 1871 was the general Limitation Act. That law is no longer in force, and it has been decided under the present Limitation Act IXV of 1877), that the provisions of Section 5, which embody the principle laid down above, would apply to suits under the Rent Act; see Golap Ghand Nowluckha v. Krishto Ghunder Dass Biswas (I. L. R., 5 Cal., 314).
6. We are, therefore, of opinion that this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.