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Saha SamsuddIn Alias Shah ShamsuddIn Ahamed Vs. Serajal Haq - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Reported inAIR1942Cal567
AppellantSaha SamsuddIn Alias Shah ShamsuddIn Ahamed
RespondentSerajal Haq
Cases ReferredRam Lochan Singh v. Kumar Newaz Prosad Singh
Excerpt:
- .....dealing with execution proceedings in an ordinary civil court in the case of decrees passed by a revenue officer. none of them, however, is directly in point. in the well-known privy council decision in nilmoni singh deo v. taranath mukherje ('83) 9 cal. 295, their lordships had to consider the question of rent suits tried by a revenue officer under act 10 of 1859. it was held that such decrees can be executed by civil courts to whom they are transferred in another district. the decision turned upon the interpretation of the term 'civil court' in that act, and is of no direct help. in jit lal singh v. kamaleswari prosad ('14) 1 a.i.r. 1914 cal. 678, it was certainly laid down that some decrees passed by a revenue court may be executed in a civil court. i may also refer to ram lochan.....
Judgment:

Henderson, J.

1. This appeal is by the decree holder. The question at issue between the parties is whether the Munsif had jurisdiction to execute the decree in question. The respondent brought a suit under Section 106, Bengal Tenancy Act. The appellant was defendant 3, The suit was dismissed by the Assistant Settlement Officer. The respondent appealed : but instead of prosecuting his appeal on the merits he applied to the Special Judge for leave to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. This prayer was allowed: but a sum of Rs. 64 was awarded to the appellant as costs. The appellant prayed for execution to the Collector who was the ex-officio settlement officer and the Collector sent the case to the Munsif for execution.

2. The contention of the respondent before the Munsif was that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to execute a decree for costs passed by the Special Judge. The Munsif overruled the objection and the respondent appealed. The Subordinate Judge held that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to execute the decree for costs but did not decide the other points which arose for his consideration. My attention has been drawn to some decisions dealing with execution proceedings in an ordinary civil Court in the case of decrees passed by a Revenue Officer. None of them, however, is directly in point. In the well-known Privy Council decision in Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherje ('83) 9 Cal. 295, their Lordships had to consider the question of rent suits tried by a Revenue Officer under Act 10 of 1859. It was held that such decrees can be executed by civil Courts to whom they are transferred in another district. The decision turned upon the interpretation of the term 'civil Court' in that Act, and is of no direct help. In Jit Lal Singh v. Kamaleswari Prosad ('14) 1 A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 678, it was certainly laid down that some decrees passed by a Revenue Court may be executed in a civil Court. I may also refer to Ram Lochan Singh v. Kumar Newaz Prosad Singh ('09) 36 Gal. 252.

3. In the present case the question depends upon the terms of Section 107, Bengal Tenancy Act. In addition to providing for the procedure to be adopted by the Revenue Officer, it also provides that his decision in every such proceeding shall have the force and effect of a decree of a civil Court. In my judgment those words are sufficiently wide to include the procedure for transferring decrees for execution and, if that is so, there is no reason to cut down the words to mean that such a decree can only be sent to another Revenue Officer. One special argument advanced by Mr. Roy is based on the fact that the order made in this particular case did not amount to a decree, that is to say, even if the decree for costs made by the Assistant Settlement Officer could be transferred to a civil Court, the decree for costs made by the Special Judge could not, as his order does not amount to a decree. In my judgment there is no substance in this distinction. The decision shall have the effect of a decree of a civil Court and the decision that the respondent is to pay costs to the appellant has the effect of an order for costs made by a civil Court. The order of the lower Appellate Court is accordingly set aside and the case is remanded to him for determination on the other points raised in the appeal. Costs in this Court will abide the result--hearing fee one gold mohur.


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