S.K. Ghose, J.
1. The opposite parties 1 and 2 in this rule brought title Suit No. 41 of 1931 in the Second Court of the Munsif at Bagerhat which has pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 2000 for declaration of title to the Provident Fund money amounting to Rs. 3433 left by their deceased father and now in deposit with the Eastern Bengal State Railway who are defendant 4. The present petitioner is defendant 1, the widow. The plaintiffs valued the suit at Rs. 90 in respect of the declaration of title and Rs. 10 in respect of the prayer for injunction restraining defendant 1 from withdrawing the aforesaid money, in all Rs. 100. The plaintiffs relied for this valuation on Section 7 (iv (c), Court-fees Act. The defence contested the valuation and pleaded that it should be the amount of the Provident Fund money. The learned Munsif held in favour of the plaintiffs' valuation. Against that decision the pre-sent rule has been obtained.
2. It is contended for the plaintiffs opposite parties that the Munsif's decision cannot be assailed under Section 115, Civil P.C., because the Munsif had jurisdiction to decide the question of valuation and he has done so even though his decision may be wrong. For this argument the learned advocate for the plaintiffs opposite parties has relied on G.M. Falkner v. Mirza Mahomed Syed Ali AIR 1925 Cal 814. The learned Munsif however has not actually fixed the valuation upon the claim in suit, but be has based his decision upon the argument that the exact money value of the claim cannot be ascertained and Section 8 (C), Court-fees Act, cannot help, and so he has accepted the valuation as given in the plaint. If this decision is wrong, the position is that the Munsif in trying the ease will exercise his jurisdiction wrongly. The learned advocate for the plaintiffs opposite parties has also relied on Section 11 (b), Suits Valuation Act. But that is of no help because that refers for the stage in the Appellate Court after the suit has been disposed of. More-over in the present case there can be no question that the defendant petitioner has been prejudiced because if the suit goes on and is tried out in the wrong Court, the ultimate effect will be prejudicial to the defendant if not to the plaintiffs in the long run. Now the question is whether the learned Munsif was right in holding that the exact money value of the claim could not be ascertained. It is pointed out that when under Section 8(C), Court-fees Act, an objection as to valuation has been raised, it is the duty of the Court to deter-mine the correct valuation. The Munsif has proceeded upon the reasoning that the plaintiffs do not want to enforce payment of the money to them by this suit, that they only want to restrain the defendant from getting that money and to have a declaration of their own right to that money.
3. I am disposed to agree with the argument of the learned advocate for the petitioner that there is no real distinction between the right to recover money and the right to that money itself. The Munsif has overlooked the fact that in para. 6 of the plaint it is distinctly stated that the money in deposit might be given proportionately to the plaintiffs. If the suit be decreed as prayed for in the plaint, the result will be that defendant 1 will not be allowed to withdraw the money and defendant 4, the Railway Company, will be liable to hand over the money to the plaintiffs. It cannot be said that there is no objective standard in this case and it would be rather anomalous if, after the Munsif had given a declaration of title and injunction, it should be necessary for another suit to be brought in a higher Court for the purpose of recovering the money. It seems that the Munsif is wrong in not exercising his powers under Section 8(C), Court-fees Act, and determining the correct valuation of the relief claimed. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the correct valuation is the amount of the Provident Fund which is over Rs. 3000. Therefore the Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The order complained against must be reversed and the rule must be made absolute with costs payable by the plaintiffs opposite parties. The hearing fee of this rule is assessed at two gold mohurs.