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Wahari Lall Singh Vs. Greeman Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectFamily
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1882)ILR8Cal12
AppellantWahari Lall Singh
RespondentGreeman Singh and ors.
Cases ReferredDooli Chand v. Birj Bhookun Lal Awasti
Excerpt:
hindu law - reversioner--alienation by hindu widow--parties--vested and contingent interest--declaratory decree--specific relief act (i of 1877), section 42. - .....the appellants before us, greeman singh and others, intervened, and alleged that, upon the death of pharichha koer, they would be entitled to succeed to the estate of balgobind, and not the plaintiff, as he was not his daughter's son, but of his brother abhiman. they were made defendants by an order of the court dated the 20th april 1879. it also appears that the widow pharichha koer denied the relationship of the plaintiff as alleged by him. the lower court raised an issue upon this point,--viz., was the mother of the plaintiff a daughter of balgobind singh? the lower court having decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff, as well as the other issues raised in the case, awarded a decree to the following effect in favour of the plaintiff,--'that this case be decreed to the.....
Judgment:

Mitter, J.

1. This suit was brought by one Wahari Lall Singh, for a declaration that certain deeds of sale, dated the 8th and 18th May 1874, executed by two Hindu widows, Pharichha Koer and Susti Koer, widows of one Balgobind, are void and inoperative as against the plaintiff, he being the presumptive heir to the estate of Balgobind after the death of the last surviving widow, Pharichha Koer. The object of the suit was, further, to have a declaration that the plaintiff, according to Hindu law, is the next reversionary heir to the estate left by the aforesaid Balgobind. The plaintiff alleges that he is the daughter's son of the aforesaid Balgobind by Susti Koer. The suit was brought after the death of Susti Koer against Pharichha Koer, the other widow, and the person in whose favour the aforesaid deeds were executed. It appears, that while this suit was pending, the appellants before us, Greeman Singh and others, intervened, and alleged that, upon the death of Pharichha Koer, they would be entitled to succeed to the estate of Balgobind, and not the plaintiff, as he was not his daughter's son, but of his brother Abhiman. They were made defendants by an order of the Court dated the 20th April 1879. It also appears that the widow Pharichha Koer denied the relationship of the plaintiff as alleged by him. The lower Court raised an issue upon this point,--viz., was the mother of the plaintiff a daughter of Balgobind Singh? The lower Court having decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff, as well as the other issues raised in the case, awarded a decree to the following effect in favour of the plaintiff,--'That this case be decreed to the plaintiff in the manner following, to wit: that Wahari Lall, the plaintiff, in the capacity of grandson of Balgobind Singh, is entitled to the property left by his maternal grandfather after the death of Mussamut Pharichha Koer, in case he remains alive after Pharichha Koer; that it is held, that the transfer of Mouza Jugutpore made by the widows of Balgobind Singh will be declared null and void after the death of Mussamut Pharichha Koer, in case the plaintiff pays Rs. 5,835-11 to the defendant Mussamut Rajkishori; and that the prayer for issue of prohibitory orders is rejected with costs.'

2. Now it appears to us, that the first declaration, which has been made in this decree, is erroneous. It is abundantly clear upon the authorities, that a person who stands in the position of presumptive heir upon the death of a Hindu widow is not entitled to maintain a suit for a declaration of his so-called reversionary right. We may here cite only one case, which is exactly in point Dooli Chand v. Birj Bhookun Lal Awasti 6 C.L.R. 528. Some of these cases were decided before the Specific Belief Act came into operation; but in our opinion the aforesaid Act has made no alteration in the law. Section 42 q. v. supra 8 Cal. 12. refers only to existing and vested rights, and not to contingent rights like those of a person who has only a chance of succeeding to the estate of a Hindu after the death of a female heir in possession of the property. That also appears from a consideration of the difference in the language used by the Legislature in the illus. (d) and (e) of Section 42. Illustration (c) contemplates a case like the present, and the illus. (d) applies to the case of a vested right of reversion. The appellants, therefore, have no sort of interest in the suit which was brought by the plaintiff, because, if the suit was dismissed, they could not have been affected by the result; and if it was decreed, they, after the death of the widow, if they were really persons entitled to succeed to the estate of Balgobind in preference to the plaintiff, would have been entitled to claim this property also. It is only in the event of the plaintiff being entitled to succeed to the declaration which he asks for in the plaint,--viz., that he would be entitled to succeed to the estate of Balgobind after the death of Pharichha Koer, that the appellants before us would have an interest in the result of the suit. But the plaintiff is not entitled to that declaration; the appellants, therefore, should not have been made defendants in the suit. We, accordingly, set aside the order by which they were made defendants, and direct that their names be struck off from the category of defendants. We also set aside that part of the declaration given in the decree by which it is declared, that the plaintiff, as the daughter's son of Balgobind, would be entitled to the property left by his maternal grandfather after the death of Mussamut Pharichha Koer, in case he survives Pharichha Koer. As the appellants themselves intervened and applied to be made defendants, we think that they were rightly made liable for costs in the lower Court; but as to the costs of this appeal we are of opinion that they had reasonable grounds for coming up to this Court in order to have the declaration, which has been made against them, set aside. We are, therefore, of opinion, that they should not be made liable, for the costs of this appeal, and that each party should bear their own costs in this Court.


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