Lancelot Sanderson, C.J.
1. This was a Rule granted by my learned brother and me calling upon the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the opposite party to show cause why the order granting sanction should not be set aside on sixth ground mentioned in the petition. The sixth ground is as follows: 'For that the case is not a fit one for sanction.'
2. The petitioner G.B. Nairkar brought a charge against two individuals who are called the opposite party, Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and Surendra Nath Tagore, and his charge was in respect of alleged offences under Sections 355 and 501 respectively of the Indian Penal Code. Section 355 is Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished...' Section 504 runs as follows: 'Whoever intentionally insults and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, shall be punished....'
3. I need not go into the facts in detail, but it appears that the petitioner was an agent of the Insurance Company and paid a visit to the Head Office of that Company of which Mr. Tagore was the Secretary and Mr. Sarkar was the Assistant Secretary; and there is no doubt whatever in my mind that an incident of some kind or other did take plane there. I am not going into the details of it. I think it is quite possible that the petitioner may have exaggerated what took place, but there is one thing which is clear to me, and that is that the incident was undoubtedly of a trivial nature. The learned Magistrate was of that opinion, because after be had heard some witnesses for the prosecution and the case was adjourned for the convenience of the petitioner, (then the complainant), on the further occasion when the complainant did not appear, the learned Magistrate acquitted the two defendants saying that the complainant was not present and the matter was an extremely trivial one. The question arises whether under those circumstances, the Magistrate ought to have granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 211 for making a false charge against the two defendants knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such charge against them. In my view, in a case such as this, sanction ought not to be granted. The whole thing was of such a trivial nature, as was described by the learned Magistrate, that when the defendants had been acquitted, the matter ought to have been dropped.
4. The learned Advocate-General, however, drew our attention to several allegations which the petitioner had made in his petition to the Magistrate's Court, and which were used by him, as showing a reason for the alleged assault being made. They are, in my opinion, serious allegations against these two gentlemen. It is said by the learned Advocate General that they are absolutely false. An affidavit has been put in on their behalf to show that they are absolutely false. I express no opinion as to whether they are true or they are false: but I am clear that they are immaterial to the point we have got to decide, namely, whether the petitioner instituted a false charge in respect of Sections 355 and 504 before the Presidency Magistrate. Under those circumstances, having regard, as I have already said, to the trivial nature of the charge which was made, and having regard to the way the Magistrate had dealt with it, namely, that he acquitted the defendants on the ground that the case was of trivial nature, and the complainant was not present, I think it is not a case where sanction to prosecute ought to be granted under Section 211.
5. The result, is that the Rule is made absolute, and we make an order revoking the sanction.
6. I ggree.