1. The facts giving rise to this Rule briefly are as follows: The petitioner who is the landlord let out certain premises to the opposite party Rai Sahib Sakti Bhusan Roy sometime in March 1942 at a rental of Rs. 50 per month. An application was made under the House Rent Control Order 1943, by the landlord for fixing the rent and by consent the rent was fixed at Rs. 72 per month on 2nd November 1943. On 13th January 1944, the opposite party instituted a suit for the recovery of money paid as occupier's share of taxes stating that the sum of Rs. 72 included taxes. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes decreed it. The matter came up before this Court and the matter was remanded and is still pending. On 27th April 1949, the landlord applied for setting aside the consent order which was passed on 2nd November 1943, the application purporting to be made under Section 151, Civil P. C. The application was dismissed by she Additional Rent Controller. An appeal was taken to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes and he dismissed the appeal. Then there was an application for review on 25th August 1949 before the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes and that application was rejected. Against that order she present Rule has been obtained.
2. In our opinion, this Rule must be discharged. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indian Homeopathic Medieal Association v. Kanailal Pal, : AIR1950Cal263 that this Court has no power of revising the orders passed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in matters like these. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that although this Court had no power to interfere before the Constitution came into force, it hag now power to do so under Article 227, Constitution Act, and we are invited to exercise that power. When the order was passed it was a final order with which this Court could not interfere. The Constitution Act was not in force then. Assuming that subsequently this Court has been given powers of interference that would not in our opinion entitle this Court to interfere with an order which was passed at a time when such power of interference did not exist In this connection I would refer to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, 64 I. A. 421 : (A. I. R. (14) 1927 P. C. 242). The passage in which this principle has been laid down appears at page 425. This is what their Lordships said :
'The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A. C. 369: (74 L. J. P. C. 77) where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matter of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.'
There is nothing is Article 227, Constitution Act, which would indicate that there was such an intendment as is sought to be attributed to Article 227. Certainly there are no express words in the Article which would give the Court the right to interfere with a right in existence at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act.
3. In these circumstances we are of opinion that this Rule must be discharged with costs. Certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted.
K.C. Chunder J.