1. We think that this appeal must be allowed. It appears to us that the lower Appellate Court has mistaken the application of the law of limitation to the case. The judgment of that Court says: The plaintiffs, therefore, are bound to prove that the ijaradars were in possession of the disputed land to the end of the term of their ijara, and if it comes out that the ijaradars did hold possession up to the end of the term of the ijara, then the cause of action of the plaintiff's may be held to have arisen just as the ijara terminated, otherwise the plaintiffs were bound to bring this suit within twelve: years from the time at which the ijaradars were dispossessed from the land or from the time at which their (the ijaradars) predecessors had been. dispossessed, in case the defendants were never in possession.
2. That appears to us to be a misapprehension of the law. The facts are very short. The land was purchased by the plaintiffs, and at the time when they acquired their title it was subject to an ijara to certain persons. During the currency of the ijara, the ijaradars were dispossessed. When did limitation begin to run against the plaintiffs? Did it run from the dispossession of the ijaradars, or from the termination of the ijara? It appears to us that it clearly runs from the determination of the ijara. Prior to that date they might possibly have a right to bring a suit for declaration of their title, and the Court would have power, probably in its discretion, to give them a declaratory decree; but they certainly had no power to sue for possession. Now by what rule in the Limitation Act is their right to sue governed? It may fall either under Article 140 of the second schedule, or under Article 144. It will be convenient first to refer to Article 139. That deals with a case where the suit is by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant, and there the time runs from the determination of the tenancy. That is the only section dealing expressly with the case of a landlord as such. The next article says that in a suit by a remainder man, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, for possession of immoveable property, the point from which time runs is, 'when his estate falls into possession.' Probably in this article, the expression' other than a landlord, 'means' other 'than a landlord as such suing his tenant.' If that be so, then that article would apparently govern this case, and the time would run from the termination of the ijara. If the case does not fall within that article, then it must fall within Article 144, as being a suit 'for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specifically provided for.' Then the period of limitation begins to run from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 'Plaintiff,' by the interpretation clause, includes any person through whom the plaintiff claims; but the plaintiffs do not claim through the ijaradars. Therefore, possession adverse to the ijaradars is not possession adverse to the present plaintiffs. This conclusion is entirely in accordance with the construction put upon our earlier Limitation Act, in the case to which we have been referred, Woomesh Chunder Goopto v. Raj Narain Roy 10 W.R. 15. We think, therefore, that the decree of the lower Appellate Court should be reversed, and the decree of the Munsif in plaintiff's favour affirmed.
3. The Appellant will have his costs in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court.