1. In this case the first question that arises is whether the surrender made by the widow in September 1910 was operative, because, if it was, there was nothing for the plaintiff's vendor to sell when the sale took place in the following March.
2. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff appellant that the surrender was not really a surrender, but a sale, because there was consideration, the consideration being the rent for which a decree had been obtained and accrued since the date of the suit. It appears to me that there is no reason for saying that it was not a surrender to the landlord; no authority has been shown to us for holding that the surrender must be by an instrument registered. For these reasons this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Suam Sul Huda, J.
3. I agree. Under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immoveable property determines, by express surrender, that is to say, by the lessee yielding up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them. It is found that in this case the lessee did surrender her interest by mutual agreement, and it seems to me that it makes no difference that the mutual agreement was by reason of a consideration that was received from the tenant by the landlord. The Transfer of Property Act does not require a registered document in such oases and no authority has been shown to us in support of this contention.
4. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.