1. In this case the District Judge has reversed the decree of the: Court of First Instance, wholly relying upon the Privy Council ruling in the case of Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh I.L.R. 3 Cal. 198. It appears to us that this ruling has no application to he facts of this case. Here the creditor, the appellant before us, sued the father of a joint Mitakshara family upon a bond executed by him, obtained a decree, and in execution of that decree attached the family property. Thereupon the sons intervened and objected to the sale of the entire family property; their objection was disallowed by the execution Court. Thereupon, before the sale was brought about, the present suit was brought by the plaintiffs, the sons, to obtain a declaration that their interest in the family property is not liable to be taken in execution of the decree against the father. The Court of First Instance held that it was not proved that the bond debt was contracted for immoral purposes; on the other hand the finding is that it was contracted for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the marriage ceremonies of some of the plaintiffs. Upon that finding of fact the lower Court dismissed the suit, and so far as that finding is concerned, it has not been set aside by the lower Appellate Court, but the lower Appellate Court thinks that upon the facts found the ruling in the case of Deendyal Lal applies. It is quite clear that the decision of the lower Appellate Court is erroneous; the ruling in Deendyal Lal's case only applies where the father's interest alone is sold in execution of decree. In this case the plaintiffs, the sons, are seeking to establish the nonliability of their interest in the family property to sale in execution of a decree against the father, and they must make out that the debt which was the basis of the decree was contracted for immoral purposes. As upon that point the finding of the Court of First Instance is against them, and that finding has not been set aside by the lower Appellate Court, it appears to us that the suit was rightly dismissed by the first Court. We accordingly reverse the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and restore that of the Court of First Instance with costs in all the Courts.