1. This appeal is by four accused persons. Accused Fazar Ali has been convicted Under Sections 147, 326/149 and Section 323, I. PC, Kasimali Under Section148, 326/149 and Under Sections 323 and 325, I. PC, Abdul Aziz Under Sections 148 and 326, I. PC. and Yonus Under Sections 148 324 and 326/149, I. PC. The accused have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on a unanimous verdict of a jury.
2. It appears to be perfectly clear that the facts of the case giving rise to the prosecution have been elaborately dealt with by the learned Sessions Judge in his careful charge to the jury and that all the salient features of the case for the prosecution as well as for the defence were placed before the jury with great care and attention. The defence case was laid before the jury in detail and all the main features of the defence so far as the evidence was concerned were placed before the jury by the learned Judge in his charge. After placing the material portions of the evidence before the jury, the learned Judge explained the law applicable to the case. The charge to the jury shows that Section 147, I. PC, was explained to the jury in very great detail and the elements of the offence contemplated by that section were placed before the jury. With reference to the other sections arising for consideration in the case all the provisions of those sections had been explained by the learned Judge to the jury of which mention may be made of Sections 147 to 149 and Sections 321 to 326, I. PC. The learned Judge's summary of the provisions of those various sections was definite and clear, and we are of opinion that nothing was left out which could be of real assistance to the jury in applying the law to the facts and circumstances of the case before them.
3. The learned advocate appearing for the appellants has, in the first place argued that the learned Judge's explanation of the law was not clear and that it had the effect of confusing the jury. As has been indicated already the learned Judge's charge to the jury so far as it related to the explanation of the law appears to us to be not one open to any just comment. The provisions of the law were carefully analysed by the learned Judge in his charge to the jury and in our opinion there was nothing left out in view of which it could be said that the jury had not the law applicable to the case explained to them in the proper way.
4. As to the other part of the Judge's charge, so far as it related to the placing of the evidence before the jury was concerned it appears to us that in view of the manner in which the learned Judge placed the evidence before the jury it is impossible to say that there was any misdirection in the charge. Reference has been made before us to matters of detail, and it has been argued that there were some matters which were not placed before the jury and to which the attention of the jury was not specifically drawn by the learned Judge. With reference to this it may be said that matters of detail which may appear to be of importance to the learned advocate for the accused may not be matters of such great importance taking the evidence as a whole. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed in the case of Arnold v. Emperor AIR 1914 PC 116:
In a protracted narrative of fact the determination of which is ultimately left to the jury it must needs be that the view of the Judge may not coincide with the views of others who look upon the whole proceedings in black type. It would however not be in accordance either with usual or with good practice to treat such cases as cases of misdirection, if upon the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province.
5. In the case before us all the main points in the evidence had been carefully placed before the jury, and the fact that one or two minor details to which reference has been made before us had not been placed before the jury would not amount to such a misdirection on account of which it could be said that the entire trial was vitiated. The learned advocate for the appellant laid stress upon the position that the learned Judge had not placed before the jury the law relating to the right of private defence in the accused persona so far as person and property were concerned. According to the learned advocate that right had not been explained, and it would have been possible for the jury to come to the conclusion that the accused persons had the right of defence of person and property in them, if the law on the subject had been explained to the jury. It is to be noticed in this connexion that the whole of the defence case was placed before the jury in detail; but on behalf of the defence no question of any right of private defence or defence of person and property was raised before the learned Sessions Judge. If upon the materials placed before the Court, by the prosecution and the defence there was no question of the right of defence of person and property which could possibly arise it was not necessary for the learned Judge to explain the law on the subject to the jury, to enable them to come to a conclusion on that question. As indicated above such a question was not involved in the case before the jury.
6. The learned advocate appearing for the appellants has stated in the course of his argument before us, that the sentences passed on the accused persons are very severe. We are unable to hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and regard being had to the unanimous verdict of the jury there is any reason for our interfering with the sentences as passed by the learned Sessions Judge. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. The conviction and the sentences passed on the accused appellants are upheld. The appellants must surrender to their bail and serve out the remainder of the sentences passed on them.