1. This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Dumka allowing an attachment of the estate of the judgment-debtor and appointing a Receiver.
2. By a compromise between the parties in appeal from Original Decree No. 467 of 1907, it was decreed that the decretal amount was to be paid to the decree-holder in three instalments and failure to pay any two consecutive instalments was to entitle the plaintiff decree-holder to realize the entire amount due at the time of such default by executing the entire decree, it being further stated in the petition of compromise that the decretal amount was realizable from the estate of the late Raja Udit Narain Singh (the deceased husband of the judgment-debtor) as well as from the defendant judgment-debtor personally.
3. There having been default in the payment of two consecutive instalments, the dtcree-holder applied for execution of his entire decree and prayed for realisation of the decretal amount by the appointment of a Receiver for 13 Taluks mentioned in the schedule to the application. This application states, as a ground for the realization of the decretal amount by means of a Receiver, the fact that in another suit the 13 Taluks bad been declared Ghatwali. On this application, the judgment-debtor was called upon to show cause why her estate should not be attached and placed under a Receiver. She appeared and applied for two weeks time, which application was refused and the whole of her estate, with some exceptions specified in the order, was attached and the Deputy Commissioner was appointed Receiver, the Court issuing directions to the mustagirs and ryots not to pay rents to any body other than the Deputy Commissioner or his duly constituted agents. The judgment-debtor was forbidden to make any collections during the continuance of the attachment.
4. Though the order relates to two matters, viz., attachment and the appointment of a Receiver, this appeal is in respect of the latter only. A preliminary objection that no appeal lay was raised on behalf of the respondent but as it was not pressed, we need not deal with it at any length. It will be sufficient for us to say that in our view an appeal does lie against the order of the Subordinate Judge.
5. Though in the grounds of appeal no exception has been taken to the attachment, the argument on behalf of the appellant addressed to us has been directed mainly to show that a Ghatwali estate is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree and we have been referred to the cases reported as Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh 9 C. 187 : 9 I.A. 104 Ram Chunder v. Madho Kumari 12 C. 484 : 12 I.A. 188; Kustoora Koomaree v. Benoderam Sein 4 W.R. Mis 5; Binode Earn v. Deputy Commissioner 7 W.R. 178; Binode Ram v. Deputy Commissioner 6 W.R. 129 and Udoy Kumari v. Hari Ram 28 C. 483.
6. On a consideration of these cases, we are unable to say that they go so far as to lay down that the surplus rents and profits of Ghatwali tenures cannot be attached in the life-time of the Ghatwal, though they do lay down that the estate itself cannot be attached. The case of Kustoora Koomaree v. Benoderam Sein 4 W.R. Mis. 5 is clear authority for the proposition that the surplus proceeds of a Ghatwali tenure collected during the lifetime of the judgment-debtor are his personal property and thus liable to be taken in execution. In Surajmal Marwari v. Kristo Fershad Singh 10 C.W.N. CCLX it was held that the income of a Ghatwali property was not itself Ghatwali property and as such was liable to be sold. The appointment of a Receiver in this case is in entire accord with the view taken in the case of Udoy Kumari Ghatwali v. Hari Ram Shaha (6) which, like Rajkeshwar Deo v. Bunshidhur Marwari 23 C. 873 came from the Sonthal Parganahs. It may be open to question whether a Receiver ought to be appointed to collect rents and profits that have not accrued at the time of the appointment; bat we do not think that we ought in the present case to dissent, from the decision in Udoy Kumari Ghatwali v. Hari Ram Shaha 28 C. 483. For all that we know to the contrary, rents and profits may have accrued prior to the appointment. Had there been merely a prohibitory order issued to the Ghatwal not to receive any rents and profits from the ryots and also to the ryots not to pay their rents to the Ghatwal without the appointment of a Receiver, the order might have been open to question but the appointment of a Receiver to receive the rents and profits seems to us an order sanctioned by authority. The order for attachment of the estate may be erroneous, but as the practical effect of the appointment of the Receiver is merely to ensure that the rents and profits are properly dealt with, we do not think it necessary to interfere. We, therefore, in the view we take, dismiss this appeal, but, in the circumstances, we do not allow costs.